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Including Retirement Benefits in a Debtor's
Bankruptcy Estate: A Proposal for
Harmonizing ERISA and the Bankruptcy
Code
Michelle M, Arnopor
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA")1 in response to the tremendous growth of privately-funded pension
and profit-sharing plans throughout the country. 2 ERISA's stated purpose
was to encourage employees to save for their retirement and to ensure that
employees' anticipated pension benefits be available to them upon retirement.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.A., University
of Illinois, 1979; J.D., University of Illinois, 1982. Research for this article was
partially funded by grants from the Edgar Mayfield Faculty Research Fellowship and
the Robert W. Maupin Faculty Research Fellowship. The author wishes to thank
Shelly Sharp and Timothy Hausman for their invaluable research assistance.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. I 1989)). ERISA's original section numbers were
changed when it was codified in Title 29 of the United States Code, which contains
the federal labor provisions. Additionally, portions of ERISA were codified in the
Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 of the United States Code. References to ERISA in
this article will be to the 1988 edition of Title 29 and, where applicable, to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended [hereinafter referred to as the "Code"].
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
3. Congress declared its policy behind ERISA in the body of the statute itself:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of
employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and stfbstantial; that
the operational scope and economic impact of such plans is increasingly
interstate; that the continued well-being and security of millions of
employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans; ...
that despite the enormous growth in such plans many employees with long
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One of the ways in which Congress protected employees' pension
benefits was to provide in ERISA that such benefits could not be assigned or
alienated. Courts have generally held that ERISA's anti-alienation provisions
prevent an employee's creditors from reaching the employee's plan benefits

to satisfy their claims.4
An issue that has received significant attention recently by courts and
commentators alike is whether the Bankruptcy Code5 overrides ERISA's anti-

years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the
lack of vesting provisions in such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of
current minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with
respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; that
owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have been
accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of
anticipated benefits; and that it is therefore desirable in the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the
United States, and to provide for the free flow of commerce, that minimum
standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such plans and
their financial soundness.
Id.
4. Retirement Fund Trust of the Plumbing v. Franchise Tax Bd., 909 F.2d 1266,
1284 (9th Cir. 1990) ("We conclude that the Board's tax levy procedure is prohibited
under ERISA's anti-alienation provision"); Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d
1476, 1480 (4th Cir. 1990) ("ERISA's non-alienability provisions prevent both
voluntary and involuntary encroachments on vested benefits"); Crawford v.
LaBoucherie Bernhard Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("most courts have
construed section 206(d)(1) [29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)] to prohibit the garnishment of
pension benefits by creditors, and... the legislative history of the statute supports that
interpretation"); United Metal Prods. Corp. v. National Bank of Detroit, 811 F.2d 297,
300 (6th Cir. 1987) (pension and profit-sharing plan benefits are not generally subject
to garnishments); Tenneco Inc. v. First Va. Bank of Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688, 689-90
(4th Cir. 1983) ("By virtue of the [ERISA] statute and the regulation, an employee's

accrued benefits under such a qualified plan may not be reached by judicial process
in aid of a third-party creditor"); General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 460-63
(6th Cir. 1980) (the court concluded "that pension plan benefits are not subject to
garnishment"); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 583 F. Supp. 1221, 1224-25
(N.D. Ala. 1984), aft'd, 752 F.2d 550 (lth Cir. 1985) ("to allow garnishment of a
pension trust fund would violate the clear intent of the pension plan terms and
disregard federal law which is supported by sound public policy"); Commercial
Mortgage Ins. Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 526 F. Supp. 510, 517-18 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) ("the assignment-alienation prohibition extends to involuntary assignments
such as garnishments"); In re Komet, 104 Bankr. 799, 807 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989)
("ERISA § 206(d)(1) [§ 1056(d)(1)] successfully insulated qualified plans from state
law garnishment").
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. I 1989), referred to in this Article as
the "Bankruptcy Code." The Bankruptcy Code was enacted as Title I of the
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alienation provisions, thereby allowing creditors to reach a debtor's interest in
ERISA plan benefits once the debtor has filed for relief under the Bankruptcy
Code. The treatment accorded a debtor's retirement benefits turns on whether
they become part of the bankruptcy estate available for distribution to
creditors.
When a debtor files for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy

estate is created by operation of law.6 Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code
determines which property of the debtor is to be included in the bankruptcy
estate7 and is intended to be broadly inclusive. 8 It states in part:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of
this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all of the following
property, wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c)(2) of this
section, all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the case .... 9
Sections 541(b) and 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provide that
certain items are excluded from the bankruptcy estate. The provisions are
intended to be very narrow in scope." The issue of whether retirement plans
that are qualified under ERISA should be excluded from a debtor's bankruptcy
estate hinges on the proper interpretation of section 541(c)(2) of the

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. The Bankruptcy
Code was amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984 ("BAFJA"), Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 392, and again by the Bankruptcy
Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088, 3114. For the most recent series of amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code, see Comment, Recent Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code-A
PoliticallyMotivated Less Fresh Start?, 56 Mo. L. REV. 705 (1991).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988). See also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
367, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6323. The
bankruptcy estate serves as a cornerstone in the bankruptcy process. In a Chapter 7
liquidation, for example, property remaining in the bankruptcy estate after the debtor
exercises his right to exempt certain property out of the estate for his fresh start is
distributed to creditors in partial or full. satisfaction of their claims. For a more
complete discussion of the debtor's exemption privilege, see infra notes 187-293 and
accompanying text. In a Chapter 13 rehabilitation, the size of the debtor's bankruptcy
estate determines how much he is required to pay his unsecured creditors under his
Chapter 13 plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)-(7) (1988).
8. S. REP. No. 989,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5868.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b), (c)(2) (1988).
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Bankruptcy Code. That section excludes from a debtor's bankruptcy estate his
beneficial interest in a trust that contains a restriction on transfers enforceable
under "applicable nonbankrtiptcy law."'" The term "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code and has been interpreted in
various ways by courts addressing the issue. A majority of courts have held
that ERISA's anti-alienation provisions are not "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" within the meaning of section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, and,
therefore, have included a debtor's interest in his ERISA-qualified retirement
plan in his bankruptcy estate. 2 Two circuit courts of appeals, however, have
recently concluded that ERISA constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law" and
have thus excluded the debtor's interest in these plans from14the estate. 3 The
Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari on the issue.
Under either the majority or minority approach, it is impossible to
harmonize ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code. If the majority view prevails,
one of the principal purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, the protection of
creditors' rights, is furthered. Retirement plans may, however, lose the
favorable tax treatment accorded plans that meet the requirements of ERISA,
including its anti-alienation provisions. 5 Moreover, debtors may be required
to forfeit substantial retirement assets, thereby defeating the explicit objective
of ERISA to protect individuals' pension benefits and potentially imposing
significant financial burdens on the government when the debtor retires.
On the other hand, excluding retirement plans from the bankruptcy estate
creates different conflicts. First, it promotes ERISA at the expense of
creditors. Additionally, prior to filing for bankruptcy, a debtor may be

11. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part that "[a]
restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this
title." Id.
12. At least five circuit courts of appeals currently take this position. See John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Watson (In re Kincaid), 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir.
1990); In re LeFeber, 906 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1990); Brooks v. Interfirst Bank, Fort
Worth (In re Brooks), 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988); Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l
Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016

(1986); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985); Samore v. Graham (In re
Graham), 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574
(5th Cir. 1983).
13. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits reached this conclusion in Anderson v. Raine
(In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990) and Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924
F.2d 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2275 (1991), respectively. For district and
bankruptcy court cases reaching the same result, see cases cited infra notes 81 and
174.
14. In re Lucas, 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2275 (1991).

15. See infra notes 315-22 and accompanying text.
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tempted to place assets beyond the reach of creditors by investing them in ,a

retirement plan. Permitting debtors to convert nonexempt assets into exempt
assets-before bankruptcy further frustrates the policy of protecting the rights
of creditors1 6
Even if a debtor's interest in her retirement plan is included in her
bankruptcy estate, however, plan benefits may still be placed beyond the reach
of creditors if the debtor is permitted to exempt all, or a portion, of such
benefits out of the estate for her fresh start. 17 Whether a debtor can retain
retirement benefits through this exemption process depends upon the
exemption provisions that are applicable to the debtor. Three possible
exemptions are available: the Bankruptcy Code's federal exemption scheme;' 8
the exemption statute in the debtor's state of domicile;' 9 or the anti-alienation
provisions of ERISA.2' A significant body of case law has developed around
each of these possible exemption schemes. 2 '
In order to advance the policies of both ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code,
a comprehensive solution to the pension issue is necessary. This Article first
examines the conflicting policies of ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code. It then
explores how the various courts have attempted to reconcile these policies
when faced with the issue of whether a debtor's interest in retirement plan
assets should be available for distribution to creditors in bankruptcy. In
analyzing the relevant case law, the Article examines cases addressing the
exclusion issue (whether pension plans should be excluded from the
bankruptcy estate entirely). It also evaluates cases addressing the exemption
issue (whether plan assets, once included in the bankruptcy estate, can be
exempted out of the estate by the debtor as part of his fresh start). Finally,
the Article proposes extensive amendments to the relevant provisions of both
ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code in an effort to strike a balance between the
competing objectives of the two statutes and resolve the conflict that has
emerged among the circuits.

16. For a discussion of the conversion issue, see infra notes 312-14 and
accompanying text.
17. The fresh start concept is discussed infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1988).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (1988).

20. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
21. For a complete discussion of each alternative exemption scenario, see infra
notes 187-293 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline -- 56 Mo. L. Rev. 495 1991

496

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

II. RETIREMENT PLAN ASSETS AS PROPERTY OF THE BANKRUPTCY
ESTATE: STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND COMPETING POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Policy Objectives of ERISA
In enacting ERISA, Congress established a comprehensive scheme for
regulating private pension plans.' According to the House committee report,

the statute was designed to:
achieve a strengthening of the role played by private retirement plans within

the fabric of our economic and social structures. Its most important
purpose will be to assure American workers that they may look forward,
with anticipation, to a retirement with financial security and dignity, and
without fear that this period of life will be lacking
in the necessities to
3
sustain them as human beings within our society.2

Congress employed two complementary approaches in ERISA to strengthen
the role of private pension plans in the economy. First, labor provisions were
included in ERISA that were intended to safeguard pension investments and
improve employees' understanding of plans. These provisions, which are
codified in Title 29 of the United States Code,24 (i) require that employees'
plan benefits be vested within a specified period of time; 2 (ii) establish
funding requirements to assure that a plan retain sufficient funds to pay
benefits due to its employees;' (iii) institute a mandatory insurance program
to guarantee that employees receive their vested benefits should a pension plan
be terminated; 27 and (iv) compel employers to communicate certain informa-

22. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4639, 4647.

23. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4639, 4646.
24. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. I 1989)).
25. In the legislative history of ERISA, Congress defines vesting as "[t]he
nonforfeitable right of interest which an employee participant acquires in the pension
fund. The benefit credits may vest in the employee immediately, although in most
cases participants do not become eligible for vesting of benefits until a stipulated age

or period of service, or a combination of both, is attained." H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639,
4643-44.
26. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4639, 4645.
27. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
HeinOnline -- 56 Mo. L. Rev. 496 1991
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tion regarding the operation of the plan to their employees in a format that can
be easily understood.'
Second, tax provisions were included in ERISA and codified in Title 26
of the United States Code that were designed to encourage the formation and
growth of private pension plans by affording favorable tax treatment to
"qualified" plans2 9 in the Internal Revenue Code.30 This favorable tax
treatment can be summarized as follows:
Employers, within certain limits, are permitted to deduct contributions made
to these plans for covered employees whether or not their interests are
vested; earnings on the plan's assets are exempt from tax; and covered
employees defer payment of tax on employer contributions made on their
behalf until they actually receive the benefits, generally after retirement
when their incomes and hence applicable tax rates tend to be lower.31
ERISA is an extraordinarily complex statute, and its dual labor and tax
provisions often use different terminology to refer to essentially similar types
of plans. Although a complete discussion of the characteristics of the various
ERISA-qualified plans is beyond the scope of this Article, 32 a brief examination of the structure of ERISA is necessary to understand the types of plan
benefits that trustees and creditors are attempting to incorporate into the
bankruptcy estate.

CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4838-39.
28. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4649.
29. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4639, 4671. A plan is "qualified" if it meets certain

nondiscrimination and vesting rules established in the Internal Revenue Code. Id. A
discussion of the Code's plan qualification rules is beyond the scope of this Article.
30. Provisions governing ERISA plans are scattered throughout the Internal
Revenue Code. However, the major provisions of ERISA, including plan qualification
requirements, are contained in I.R.C. §§ 401-457 (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
31. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4672.
32. For an excellent discussion of the numerous plans and interests governed by
ERISA, as well as the rights of the participants under such plans, see Seiden, Chapter
7 Cases: Do ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code Conflict as to Whether a Debtor's
Interest in orRights Under a Qualified Plan Can be Used to Pay Claims? (pt. 1), 61
AM. BANKR. L.J. 219, 220-30 (1987).
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B. The Statutory Structure of ERISA
ERISA governs the 6peration of "employee benefit plans."33 An
employee benefit plan includes both welfare plans and pension plans.'

Welfare plans are plans that are established or maintained by an employer to
provide benefits to its employees for matters such as health care, sickness,
disability, vacation, death, or unemployment.' Pension plans, on the other
hand, are those plans that are established or maintained by an employer to
provide retirement benefits to its employees. 36 For purposes of ERISA, the

33. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). It provides:
The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any
plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to
the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained
for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries,
through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or
other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid
legal services, or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title
(other than pensions orl retirement or death, and insurance to provide such
pensions).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). It provides in relevant part:
[T]he terms "employee pension benefit plan" and "pension plan" mean any
plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to
the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund or program(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral. of income by employees for
periods extending to the termination of covered employment or
beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan,
the method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of
distributing benefits from the plan.
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term "pension plan" generally includes both profit-sharing plans37 and
pension plans.
Only pension plans, and not welfare plans, are required to comply with
ERISA's anti-alienation provisions. 39 The purpose of these provisions is to
protect an employee's accrued retirement benefits from the reach of creditors
as well as from the employee's own financial irresponsibility.40 ERISA's
anti-alienation provisions are found in the federal labor statutes and state that

"[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may
not be assigned or alienated." 41 Similarly, the Internal Revenue Code
provides that a retirement plan and accompanying trust will not receive
favorable tax treatment unless the plan contains an anti-alienation provision.42

Although the terms "assigned" and "alienated" are not defined by statute,
treasury regulations under the Internal Revenue Code have expanded upon the
terms by stating that plan benefits cannot be "anticipated, assigned (either at
law or in equity), alienated or subject to attachment,
garnishment, levy,
43
execution or other legal or equitable process. ,

37. Profit-sharing plans are one type of defined contribution plan. For a
discussion of the different types of defined contribution plans, see Seiden, supra note
32, at 221-22. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)-(3) (1988 & Supp. 11989). See also Seiden, supra note

32, at 238. Pension plans are referred to as defined benefit plans. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(35) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
40. Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476, 1480 (4th Cir. 1990);
Crawford v. LaBoucherie Bernhard Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Commercial Mortgage Ins. Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 526 F. Supp. 510,
517-18 (N.D. Tex. 1981). See also Brankey & Darr, DebtorInterestsin PensionPlans
as Property of the Debtor'sEstate, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 275, 279 (1990).

41. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988 & Supp. 11989).
42. The Code states in pertinent part: "A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust
under this section unless the plan of which such trust is part provides that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A)
(1988 & Supp. 11989).
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (as amended in 1988). The regulations further
provide that the terms "assignment" and "alienation" include
(i) Any arrangement providing for the payment to the employer of
plan benefits which otherwise would be due the participant under the plan,
and

(ii) Any direct or indirect arrangement (whether revocable or
irrevocable) whereby a party acquires from a participant or beneficiary a
right or interest enforceable against the plan in, or to, all or any part of a
plan benefit payment which is, or may become, payable, to the participant
or beneficiary.

Treas. Reg. §-1.401(a)-13(c) (as amended in 1988).
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There are three statutory exceptions to ERISA's anti-alienation provisions. First, a plan participant who is receiving benefits under a pension plan
can voluntarily assign up t6 ten percent of any benefit payment to another
party without violating the plan's anti-alienation clause, so long as the
assignment is revocable.' Second, if certain requirements are met, a plan
participant can use her vested benefits as collateral for a loan from the
plan.'
Finally, in response to a judicially created exception for family
support obligations, 6 Congress enacted a third exception to ERISA's antialienation provisions in 1984. Effective on January 1, 1985, a plan
participant's benefits can be assigned for the benefit of a spouse, child, or
other dependent pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO"). 4'
Additionally, several courts created a judicial exception to ERISA's antialienation provisions for liabilities arising from an employee's criminal
misconduct toward his employer; 48 the Supreme Court, however, has recently

44. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A) (1988

& Supp. I 1989). A garnishment or attachment is not considered a voluntary
assignment. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(d)(1) (as amended in 1988).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A) (1988
& Supp. 1 1989); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(d)(2) (as amended in 1988).
46. For a discussion of this exception, see Crawford v. LaBoucherie Bernhard
Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(B) (1988
& Supp. I 1989); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13T (1985). A domestic relations order is

defined as:
any judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement
agreement) which(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony
payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse,

child, or other dependent of the participant, and
(II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law
(including a community property law).
29 U.S.C. § 1056(B)(ii) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
48. Crawford, 815 F.2d at 121; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 583 F.

Supp. 1221, 1228 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 752 F.2d 550 (11th Cir. 1985). But see
Ellis Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986),
where the court refused to adopt the "criminal misconduct" exception to ERISA's antialienation provisions. Moreover, another court refused to find an exception to
ERISA's anti-alienation provisions for fraud. United Metal Prods. Corp. v. National

Bank of Detroit, 811 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 1987).
There are also several limited exceptions to ERISA's anti-alienation provisions
authorized by treasury regulations, including income tax withholding on plan benefits
as well as an exception allowing recovery from the participant of benefit overpayments. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(2) (as amended in 1988). For a more complete
discussion of exceptions contained in treasury regulations, see also Seiden, supra note
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held such an exception to be inappropriate, stating that any exception to
ERISA's anti-alienation provisions should be left to Congress.49
Because welfare plans are not subject to ERISA's anti-alienation
provisions, there is no disagreement that benefits received by a debtor under
such plans should be included in the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Only the
fate of pension plans is in dispute. Whether a debtor's interest in a pension
plan should become part of his bankruptcy estate depends upon the proper
interpretation of section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.

C. The Policy Objectives of the Bankruptcy Code
The federal bankruptcy system was established in 1898,5' and was
substantially modified in 1938 following the Great Depression.52 Congress
finally overhauled the bankruptcy laws completely in 1978 in an effort to

32, at 241-42.
49. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680, 687
(1990). The Court in Guidry held:
Nor do we think it appropriate to approve any generalized equitable
exception-either for employee malfeasance or criminal misconduct-to
ERISA's prohibition on the assignment or alienation of pension benefits.
Section 206(d) [the anti-alienation provision] reflects a considered
Congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of income for
pensioners (and their dependents, who may be, and perhaps usually are,
blameless), even if that decision prevents others from securing relief for the
wrongs done them. If exceptions to this policy are to be made, it is for
Congress to undertake that task.
Id. (footnote omitted).
50. There was disagreement over this issue until 1988, when it was resolved by
the Supreme Court in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825
(1988). For a complete discussion of the Mackey case and its application to welfare
benefit plans, see Note, ERISA, Employees, and Creditors' Rights: A Search for a
Consistent Theme, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 461, 473-75 (1989). See also infra notes 264-93
and accompanying text. However, disability, sickness, and unemployment benefits
may be exempted out of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, and therefore beyond the reach
of creditors, pursuant to § 522(d)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code if the debtor elects the
federal exemption scheme. For a complete discussion of property exemptions in
bankruptcy, see infra notes 187-293 and accompanying text.
51. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). This act is entitled
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and will be hereinafter referred to as the Bankruptcy Act.
52. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (the "Chandler Act"). A history
of the evolution of modem day bankruptcy law can be found in E. WARREN & J.
WESTBROOK,

THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS

187-93 (2d ed. 1991).
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modernize the court system and provide greater relief for consumer debtors.5 3
One of the overriding goals of Congress in establishing the federal bankruptcy
system has been to provide uniformity in the treatment of both debtors and
creditors across the country.54
The current Bankruptcy Code is intended to promote two competing
policies. First, it gives debtors a fresh start after bankruptcy, unencumbered
by most pre-bankruptcy debts, 55 in order to "give an honest debtor a new
opportunity in life without the pressure and discouragement of substantial
infebtedness." 56 Second, the Bankruptcy Code attempts to provide an
equitable distribution of the debtor's property to his creditors and maximize
57
the return to creditors without hindering the debtor's need for a fresh start.
The Bankruptcy Code significantly amended the old Bankruptcy Act in
defining the scope of the bankruptcy estate. Under the old Bankruptcy Act,
the estate consisted of all the debtor's property that could be transferred by the
debtor or levied upon and sold, 58 except that needed for his fresh start. The

53. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1011330 (1988). See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 5965-66.
54. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 5963; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 5787, 5787.
55. The concept of the fresh start is reiterated in the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code: "At the heart of the fresh start provisions of the bankruptcy law is
section 727 covering discharge. The discharge provisions require the court to grant
the debtor a discharge of all his debts except for very specific and serious infractions
on his part." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787,5793. See also Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726
F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1984).
The primary means by which the debtor is afforded a fresh start is through the
exemption process, whereby the debtor can retain certain property needed for survival,
such as a homestead and a modest amount of clothing and furniture. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 522 (1988). See also infra notes 187-293 and accompanying text.
56. B.

WEINTRAUB

& A. RESNICK,

BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL

1-3 (1986).

57. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 177-78, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6138.
58. Section 70(a)(5) of the old Bankruptcy Act gave the bankruptcy trustee title
to all property of the debtor "which, prior to the filing of the petition he [the debtor]
could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold
under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered."
11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970) (repealed 1978).
This was the provision in the old Act that excluded spendthrift trusts from the
debtor's bankruptcy estate. "Under this transferability-leviability standard, a bankrupt's
beneficial interest in a trust was not part of the estate if the interest could not be
transferred or levied upon under state law. Thus to the extent a state recognized the
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Bankruptcy Code expanded the definition of property of the estate to include
all of the debtor's property interests, including property needed for his fresh
start.59 After the estate is established, the debtor can then exempt certain
property out of the estate and retain it for his fresh start, such as a homestead
and limited amounts of clothing and furniture.6 The legislative history of
the Bankruptcy Code reveals that the purpose underlying the expansion of the
scope of the estate was to give the bankruptcy judge greater control over the
exemption and distribution process, thereby promoting the dual policies of the
Bankruptcy Code.6

D. The Statutory Framework of the Bankruptcy Code
The filing of a bankruptcy petition, either by the debtor in a voluntary
case 62 or by the creditors in an involuntary case,6 creates a bankruptcy
estate.'
Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the estate
consists of all legal or equitable property interests owned by the debtor at the
time that the bankruptcy petition is filed.0 It is intended to be broad in

validity of a spendthrift trust provision, the trustee in bankruptcy had no rights to the
trust funds." Graham, 726 F.2d at 1271 (citations omitted).
59. The legislative history to the Bankruptcy Code states that section 541(a)
"includes as property of the estate all property of the debtor, even that needed for a
fresh start. After the property comes into the estate, then the debtor is permitted to
exempt it under proposed 11 U.S.C. 522 ...... H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 368, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6324; S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5787, 5868.
60. The exemption process was not a departure from prior law, but Congress
amended the old Bankruptcy Act by providing two different exemption schemes, state
and federal, from which the debtor could choose. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 360, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6316. For
a more complete discussion of the exemption process, see infra notes 187-293 and
accompanying text.
61. For example, the Senate Report states that "Chapter 5 reflects the policy of
the revision of the Bankruptcy Act to include all of the property of the debtor in the
bankruptcy case .... As a result of these changes the amounts that will be returned
to all creditors can be greater." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5791. See also 4 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY § 541.02(1) (L. KING 15th ed. 1991); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham),
726 F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1984).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988). See also supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
65. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
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scope, including both tangible and intangible property, causes of action, and
any possessory interest of the debtor, such as a leasehold interest.' Generally, the Bankruptcy Code ignores provisions in agreements or instruments that
restrict or condition transfer of a debtor's property interest, and includes such
interests in the estate. 67 There is, however, a limited exception to this rule
in section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, which states that "[a] restriction
on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this
title [the Bankruptcy Code]."(8
The issue with which courts and commentators have been grappling in
recent years is what constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law" for purposes
of section 541(r)(2).69 If ERISA's anti-alienation provisions are considered
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, then
such restrictions are enforceable and a debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified
pension plan will be excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Although
it is difficult at first blush to understand why ERISA would not constitute
"applicable nonbankruptcy law," an argument can be made that the legislative
history of section 541 restricts the exclusion under section 541(c)(2) to state

spendthrift trust law. For example, the House Report states that:
The bill also continues over [from the old Bankruptcy Act] the exclusion
from property of the estate of the debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust to
the extent the trdst is protected from creditors under applicable State law.
The bankruptcy of the beneficiary should not be0 permitted to defeat the
legitimate expectations of the settlor of the trust.

66. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 367, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
& ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6323; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82,
reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5868.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (1988). It provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an interest of
the debtor in property becomes property of the estate.., notwithstanding
any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law(A) that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the
debtor ....
Id.
Although any transfer restrictions are ignored for purposes of determining
property of the estate, such provisions may restrict the trustee's rights to affect the
property. See, e.g., infra notes 323-31 and accompanying text for an illustration of this
concept with respect to retirement plans.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
69. See infra notes 81-186 and accompanying text.
70. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 176, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG.
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In another reference to section 541(c)(2), the House Report provides that this
subsection "preserves restrictions on transfer of a spendthrift trust to the extent
that the restriction is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law."71
The legislative history thereby creates an ambiguity as to the scope of
section 541(c)(2). Was it intended only to preserve a pre-existing exclusion
of the traditional state law spendthrift trust or, rather, was the section intended
to be broader in scope than the legislative history might suggest? Before
examining how courts have differed in their construction of the statute and its
legislative history, it is critical to understand the evolution and nature of
spendthrift trusts because much of the relevant case law has turned on the
status of the specific ERISA plan at issue as a spendthrift trust under state
law.
E. The TraditionalSpendthrift Trust
The Second Restatement of Trusts defines a spendthrift trust as a trust
which, by its terms or by statute, validly restrains both voluntary and
involuntary transfers of the beneficiary's interest therein. 7 A self-settled trust
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6136 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
71. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 368, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 5963, 6324 (emphasis added). The Senate version of section
541(c)(2) was quite different from the House version. The Senate version enforced
transfer restrictions only to the extent necessary for the debtor and his dependents'
support. It provided: "Paragraph (2) of subsection (c), however, preserves restrictions
on a transfer of a spendthrift trust that the restriction is enforceable nonbankruptcy law

to the extent of the income reasonably necessary for the support of a debtor and his
dependents." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 83, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5869.
The Senate's version of section 541(c)(2) was ultimately rejected in the final draft
of the legislation. 124 CONG. REc. H11,089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6436, 6455 (statement of the Hon. Don

Edwards, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Committee on the Judiciary). See also 124 CONG. REc. S17,406 (daily ed. Oct.
6, 1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6505, 6524 (statement
of the Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary).

72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152(2) (1959). In determining whether
a restraint on transfer is valid, the Restatement provides:
Except as stated in §§ 156 and 157, if by the terms of a trust the
beneficiary is entitled to the income from the trust property for life or for
a term of years and it is provided that his interest shall not be transferable
by him and shall not be subject to the claims of his creditors, the restraint
on the voluntary and involuntary transfer of his right to the income accruing
during his life is valid.
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(one in which the settlor is the beneficiary of the trust), however, cannot be
a valid spendthrift trust under 'the Restatement.' Although it is irrelevant
whether the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust is really a "spendthrift,"
oftentimes a settlor creates such a trust to protect the beneficiary against "his
own folly or inefficiency or misfortune."'74
A number of courts have also attempted to define a spendthrift trust. For
example, in Kansas, courts have defined it as "a trust created to provide a
fund for the maintenance of a beneficiary and at the same time to secure the
fund against his improvidence or incapacity. Provisions against alienation of
the trust fund by the voluntary acts of the beneficiary or by his creditors are
its usual incidents."' 5 Similarly, other cases have held that in order for a
beneficiary to establish that a trust qualifies as a spendthrift trust, he must
show that he cannot alienate his interest in the trust, and in addition, that he
does not enjoy absolute and effective control over distributions from, or
termination of, the trust.76 While there appears to be no single recognized
definition of a spendthrift trust, courts have agreed that, as a general rule, a
self-settled trust cannot qualify as a spendthrift trust because of
the degree of
77
control that the beneficiary/settlor can exercise over the trust.
Id. § 152(1). For an exhaustive discussion of the law of spendthrift trusts, including
their origin and validity, see E. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (1947).
73. "Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a provision
restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest, his transferee or
creditors can reach his interest."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §

156 (1959)..

74. 2 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 1131 (3d ed. 1967). See also In re Abbott,
123 Bankr. 784, 786 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
75. In re James, 126 Bankr. 360, 362 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991) (quoting In re Estate
of Sowers, 1 Kan. App. 2d 675, 574 P.2d 224, 228 (1977)). See also Levey v. First
Va. Bank, 845 F.2d 80, 82-83 (4th Cir. 1988), in which the court stated
Under Virginia law, a spendthrift trust has three defining characteristics:
First, the trust must provide for the support and maintenance of its
beneficiary; second, the settlor must intend to protect the trust from the
beneficiary's creditors; and third, the settlor must intend to prevent the
beneficiary's voluntary or involuntary alienation of trust property.
Id.
76. In re Kazi, 125 Bankr. 981, 985 n.5 (Bankr. S.D. 111. 1991) (quoting In re
Wimmer, 121 Bankr. 539, 543 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1990), aft'd, No. 91-1021 (C.D. Ill.
July 19, 1991) (WESTLAW, FBKR-CS database).
77. See, e.g., In re Groves, 120 Bankr. 956, 961 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Smith,
103 Bankr. 882, 884 n.1 (N.D. Ohio 1990); In re Gifford, 93 Bankr. 636, 638 (N.D.
Ind. 1988); In re Phelps, Nos. 85-09910-3, 86-0024-3 (W.D. Mo. July 28, 1986)
(WESTLAW, FBKR-CS database); Tabor v. Employee Benefits Comm. (In re Cress),
121 Bankr. 1006, 1013 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990), affd sub nom. Employee Benefits
Comm. v. Tabor (In re Cress), 127 Bankr. 194 (S.D. Ind. 1991). But see IND. CODE
§ 30-4-3-2(c) (1989).
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Some states do not recognize spendthrift trusts at all.78 Among those
that do, the incidents of the trust are sometimes established by the common

law and are sometimes defined by statute.79 The various states' treatment of
spendthrifts trusts has proved quite relevant to courts trying to determine
whether ERISA-qualified pension plans should be included in a debtor's
bankruptcy estate. A majority of courts addressing the issue have held that
a debtor's interest in an ERISA plan is included in the estate unless the plan
at issue qualifies as a traditional spendthrift trust under applicable state law.'
The discussion which follows thus illustrates the complete lack of uniformity
in the cases addressing this issue due to the wide disparity in treatment of
spendthrift trusts among the states.
III. INCLUDING RETIREMENT PLAN ASSETS IN THE BANKRUPTCY
ESTATE: THE CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
Until last year, only a handful of bankruptcy and district courts had held
that ERISA pension benefits were excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy
estate under section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.81 A clear majority of

78. See W. McGOVERN, S. KURTz & J. REIN, WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES 342
n.29 (1988). See also 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 396 n.54 (1975).
79. For example, Indiana courts will only recognize the validity of a spendthrift
trust if it meets specific statutory requirements:
(a) The settlor may provide in the terms of the trust that the interest of a
beneficiary may not be either voluntarily or involuntarily transferred before
payment or delivery of the interest to the beneficiary by the trustee.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), if the settlor is also a
beneficiary of the trust, a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary
transfer of his beneficial interest will not prevent his creditors from
satisfying claims from the interest in the trust estate.
(c) Subsection (a) applies to a trust that meets both of the following
requirements, regardless of whether or not the settlor is also a beneficiary
of the trust:
(1) The trust is a qualified trust under 26 U.S.C. 401(a).
(2) The limitation on each beneficiary's control over the
beneficiary's interest in the trust complies with 29 U.S.C.
1056(d).
IND. CODE § 30-4-3-2 (1989).
80. For a complete discussion of the majority view, see infra notes 86-138 and
accompanying text.
81. See In re Threewitt, 24 Bankr. 927, 929 (D. Kan. 1982) (debtor's vested,
undistributed interest in ERISA pension plan was excluded from estate; court refused
to give § 541(c)(2) an "unnecessarily narrow construction" so as to exclude ERISA
from its ambit); In re Ralstin, 61 Bankr. 502, 504 (Bankr. D. Kan 1986) (debtor's
beneficial interest in an ERISA-qualified plan was excluded from his bankruptcy estate
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the courts addressing the issue have expressed the view that the phrase
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" in section 541(c)(2) encompasses only
traditional state spendthrift trust law, and not ERISA's anti-alienation

provisions. 2 Therefore, under the majority view, ERISA pension benefits
should not be excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy estate by virtue of the
anti-alienation provisions of ERISA contained in the federal law. Many of
these courts, however, have nevertheless then excluded such benefits if the
ERISA plan at issue qualified as a traditional spendthrift trust under state
laW.

under § 541(c)(2)); In re Wiggins, 60 Bankr. 89, 95 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (debtor's
interest in an ERISA plan was excluded from his estate); In re Mosley, 42 Bankr. 181,
191 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984) (ERISA was "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under
Bankruptcy Code; therefore, debtor's employee benefit plans were excluded from the
estate in their entirety); but see In re Velis, 109 Bankr. 64, 68 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989)
aff'd, 123 Bankr. 497 (D.N.J. 1991) (only ERISA plans qualifying as spendthrift trusts
are excluded from the estate under § 541(c)(2)-Mosley reconsidered); In re Phillips,
34 Bankr. 543, 545 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (both the terms of the trust and the
ERISA statute imposed restraints on alienation enforceable in bankruptcy and which
excluded pension plan assets from the debtor's estate; holding supported by public
policy); but see In re Gribben, 84 Bankr. 494, 495 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (ERISA plans can
only be excluded from bankruptcy estate if they qualify as state spendthrift trusts); In
re Holt, 32 Bankr. 767, 772 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (debtor's interest in qualified
ERISA profit-sharing plan was excluded from the debtor's estate as ERISA was
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" under § 541(c)(2)); but see In re Ridenour, 45 Bankr.
72, 78 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) (following the decision in Graham, the court
concluded that Congress intended to exclude only those ERISA-qualified plans which
were valid spendthrift trusts under state law); contra In re Leamon, 121 Bankr. 974,
981 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990) (effectively overruled Ridenourand reinstated Holt, see
infra note 174); In re Pruitt, 30 Bankr. 330, 331 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (debtor's
interest in ERISA-qualified thrift plan was not property of the estate); but see In re
Matteson, 58 Bankr. 909, 911 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986) (reconsidered Pruitt and
concluded that Congress intended § 541(c)(2) to apply only to spendthrift trusts
recognized under state law); In re Rogers, 24 Bankr. 181, 183 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982)
(benefits of the debtors under an ERISA plan were not property of the estate under
§ 541(c)(2)); but see In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016 (1985) (ERISA plan benefits became property of the bankruptcy estate
unless the plans qualified as spendthrift trusts under state law). See also In re Bizon,
28 Bankr. 886, 889 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983), aff'd sub nom. SSA Baltimore Fed. Credit
Union v. Bizon, 42 Bankr. 338, 350 (D. Md. 1984) (debtor's interest in a retirement
fund containing an anti-alienation provision similar to ERISA was not property of the
bankruptcy estate).
82. See infra notes 86-138 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 114-38 and accompanying text.
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The Fourth Circuit's 1990 decision in Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore)8
is a pivotal case because it represents the first instance of a court of appeals
adopting the minority view, thereby excluding ERISA pension benefits from
a debtor's bankruptcy estate without resorting to state spendthrift trust law.
Moore has thus triggered a reevaluation of this issue by courts and commentators alike 5 *
A. In re Graham: The Majority View

One of the leading cases addressing whether pension benefits should be
included in a debtor's bankruptcy estate is Samore v. Graham (In re
Graham),8 in which the Eighth Circuit found that the term "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" referred exclusively to state spendthrift trust law.'
Accordingly, the court held that ERISA's restrictions on assignment or
alienation were not considered "applicable nonbankruptcy law."
In Graham, the issue faced by the court was whether the debtor's interest
in a profit-sharing retirement plan had to be turned over to the debtor's
bankruptcy estate.88 Graham was a physician whose professional services
provided the earnings for Charles W. Graham, M.D. Ltd., a professional
corporation. Graham was the sole stockholder, director, and officer of the
corporation and had established the plan for his employees.8 9 The plan met
all of the requirements of ERISA, and was thus considered a qualified plan.90
The participants in the profit-sharing plan were Graham and one other
employee. Both received plan contributions from the professional corporation
as determined by its board of directors, and both were also allowed to make
voluntary employee contributions. At the time Graham filed for bankruptcy
protection, his fully vested, accrued benefits under the plan were $150,000,

from employer contributions. 91 The bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint to
force the turnover of the debtor's accrued benefits to the bankruptcy estate. 92

84. 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990).
85. See infra notes 161-86 and accompanying text. See also Koger & Goucher,
Exception, Exemption and Preemption: The Words that Launched a Thousand
Opinions, 1991 CoM. L. BULL 10 (Jan./Feb. 1991).
86. 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
87. Id. at 1271.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1269.
90. Id. The plan also met the requirements of I.R.C. § 401(a). Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1270.
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The bankruptcy court held that Graham's interest in the plan should be
included in the estate and ordered that the benefits be turned over. 93
Graham's appeal focused on the language in section 541(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which excludes from the debtor's bankruptcy estate a
property interest subject to a restriction on alienation that is enforceable under
"applicable nonbankruptcy law." 94 Graham argued that section 541(c)(2)
excluded his plan benefits; the anti-alienation clause contained in his profitsharing plan 95 and required under the provisions of ERISA was a restriction on transfer or alienation enforceable against general
creditors, and thus
97
should be enforceable against the bankruptcy trustee.
The Eighth Circuit first recognized the scope of section 541(a) as a
broad, inclusionary provision. 98 The court then focused on the exceptions
and concluded that Congress intended section 541(c)(2) to be construed
narrowly to preserve the status of the spendthrift trust as it existed under the
old Bankruptcy Act.' The court examined the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code to find the intent of the drafters when enacting section
541(c)(2). It found that the House and Senate Reports indicated a clear intent
on the. part of Congress to preserve the status enjoyed by traditional
spendthrift trusts under the old Bankruptcy Act.100 In its opinion, the court
quoted extensively from the House Report which accompanied the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978; it emphasized that the bill retained the old Bankruptcy
Act's "exclusion from property of the estate of the debtor's interest in a
spendthrift trust to the extent the trust is protected from creditors under
applicable State law."10' The court also examined the Senate Report and

93. Id. See In re Graham, 24 Bankr. 305 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982).
94. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1270.

95. The anti-alienation provision stated: "The participant... shall not assign or
alienate any benefit provided under the Plan, and the Trustee shall not recognize any
such assignment or alienation." Id. The trustee also had the power to make a loan to
a participant from the plan if the loan was secured by the participant's nonforfeitable
accrued benefit. Id.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).

97. Graham,726 F.2d at 1271. Graham cited two cases in support of his position
that his ERISA benefits should not be available to satisfy creditors' claims: General
Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1980) and Commercial Mortgage Ins.

Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
98. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1270. For the text of section 541(a), see supra text
accompanying note 9.
99. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1271. For a discussion of the provisions of the old
Bankruptcy Act affecting the spendthrift trust, see supra note 58.
100. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1271-72.
101. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1272 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 175-76, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6136).
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found the same intent on the part of the drafters to preserve the status of
spendthrift trusts valid under state law.l'0
After its review of the legislative history, the court concluded that the
term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" was intended to include only state
spendthrift trust restrictions,1 13 and not the anti-alienation provisions
contained in ERISA. Accordingly, Graham's interest in his qualified profitsharing plan was included in his bankruptcy estate.
The court found further support for its decision in the fact that pensions
are specifically addressed under the exemption provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.' 4
Section 522(d), which sets forth the federal exemption
scheme, 05 provides that a debtor can exempt out of his bankruptcy estate
his right to receive:
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity,
or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or
length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and any dependent of the debtor, unless (i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices
of an insider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor'T
rights under such plan or contract arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service; and
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401(a),
403(a), 403(b), 408, or409 of the Internal Revenue Code of
6
1954 (26 U.S.C. 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409).1
The Graham court recognized that, with the limited exception for plans
established by insiders, the foregoing exemption would apply to plans not
qualified under ERISA. It also stated, however, that ERISA-qualified plans
would fall within the ambit of the exemption provision as well.1 7 In order

102. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1272. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 83,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5869.
103. The court in Graham defined a spendthrift trust as one "in which the right
of the beneficiary to future payments of income or capital cannot be voluntarily
transferred by the beneficiary or reached by his or her creditors." Graham, 726 F.2d
at 1271.
104. 11 U.S.C § 522(d) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). For a discussion of the effect
of the exemption provisions on the bankruptcy estate, see infra notes 187-293 and
accompanying text.
105. For a complete discussion of the exemption process, see infra notes 187-293
and accompanying text.
106. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). See Graham, 726 F.2d
at 1272.
107. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1272.
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for the plan, proceeds to be exempted out of the bankruptcy estate, the court
reasoned, they must first be included in the estate. 1'8
The court in Graham found no conflict between ERISA and the
Bankruptcy Code because of a provision in ERISA stating that it was not to
affect the operation of other federal statutes. "Nothing in this subchapter
[including the anti-alienation provisions] shall be construed to modify,
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States ... or any rule
or regulation issued under any law."'1 9 Thus, according to the court,
ERISA's anti-alienation provisions would not prohibit Graham's retirement
benefits from being included in his bankruptcy estate by operation of section
541 of the Bankruptcy Code. Based upon these considerations, the Eighth
Circuit concluded that ERISA-qualified retirement plans must be included in
a debtor's bankruptcy estate. 10
A number of courts, including five courts of appeals, have followed the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Graham."' They have held that ERISA's antialienation provisions do not constitute "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under
section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code." 2 Most of these courts, however,

108. Id. The court concluded: "A debtor's interest in pension funds first comes
into the bankruptcy estate. To the extent they are needed for a fresh start they may

then be exempted out." Id. For a recent decision reaching the same conclusion, see
In re Nadler, 122 Bankr. 162, 166 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990).
109. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1273 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988 & Supp. I
1989)).
110. The remaining issue, which is discussed infra at notes 187-293 and
accompanying text, is to what extent a debtor's pension benefits, once included in the
bankruptcy estate, can be exempted out of the estate by the debtor and retained for his
fresh start.
111. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have rendered
decisions following the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in Graham. See John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Watson (In re Kincaid), 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990); In re
LeFeber, 906 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1990); Brooks v. Interfirst Bank, Fort Worth (In re
Brooks), 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988); Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re
Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); In re
McLean, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985); but see Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907
F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985); Goff v.
Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). See also In re Swanson, 873 F.2d
1121, 1123 (8th Cir. 1989), in which the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its decision in
Graham, holding that the language of § 541(c)(2) should be given a narrow reading
to encompass only the traditional spendthrift trust. For a seemingly exhaustive list of
cases following the majority view, see Koger & Goucher, supra note 85, at 12-14.
112. One district court in the Eighth Circuit, however, has refused to follow
Graham and has instead treated ERISA as "applicable nonbankruptcy law," thereby
excluding the debtors' retirement benefits from their bankruptcy estates. See In re
Carver, No. 91-3041-CV-S-4 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 1991) (WESTLAW, Allfeds
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have then gone on to analyze whether the ERISA plan at issue in the case
would qualify as a spendthrift trust under state law, and have excluded the
debtor's pension benefits from his bankruptcy estate if the plan fit within the
spendthrift trust definition. Only a few courts have taken the position that
ERISA plan benefits must be included in the estate regardless of whether the
plan would *qualify as a traditional spendthrift trust. n3
B.

The Majority's Analysis of State Spendthrift Trust Law

Courts that have considered whether a debtor's interest in an ERISAqualified plan constitutes a spendthrift trust under applicable state law have
consistently examined the degree of the debtor's "dominion and coitrol" over
the assets in the plan." 4 If the debtor lacks a sufficient degree of control
over plan assets, then the plan is generally held to constitute a valid
spendthrift trust and the debtor's interest in the plan is excluded from the
bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2). 5 Conversely, if the debtor is
found to exercise a great deal of control over plan assets, then the plan
ordinarily does not qualify as a traditional spendthrift trust, and, therefore, the
6
debtor's interest in the plan becomes part of the estate." Some courts have

database). In reaching its decision, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision
in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680 (1990). It
reasoned that, because Guidiy held that Congress must initiate any exception to
ERISA's anti-alienation provisions, "any judicial opinion creating an exception for the
trustee to reach the debtor's benefits in an ERISA plan is contrary to the holding in
Guidry." Carver,slip. op. at 4. For a discussion of courts of appeals cases adopting
this minority view, see infra notes 139-73 and accompanying text.
113. These have generally been cases in the Eighth Circuit that have interpreted
Graham as holding that a debtor should be permitted to retain his pension benefits
only if they could be exempted out of the bankruptcy estate under § 522(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Loe, 83 Bankr. 641, 645 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988);
In re Bowen, 80 Bankr. 1012, 1016 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987); In re Bartlett, 67 Bankr.
455, 456 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986); In re McKenna, 58 Bankr. 221, 223 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1985). See also In re White, 47 Bankr. 410, 413 (W.D. Wash. 1985); In re
Crenshaw, 44 Bankr. 30, 33 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984). For a discussion of the
exemptioli process in bankruptcy, see infra notes 187-293 and accompanying text.
Graham has also been interpreted as holding that an ERISA plan can be excluded
from the debtor's estate entirely if it qualifies as a spendthrift trust under state law.
See, e.g., In re O'Brien, 94 Bankr. 583,585-86 (W.D. Mo. 1988); In re Gallagher, 101
Bankr. 594, 602 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
114. See, e.g., Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1167; In re Kaplan, 97 Bankr. 572, 577
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989).
115. See infra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
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adopted a middle ground position and have held that a portion of the debtor's
interest in plan assets, generally those contributed by the employer, are
excluded from the eitate as a valid spendthrift trust. The remainder of the
debtor's interest, generally those assets contributed by the debtor, are included
in the bankruptcy estate because that portion of the plan does not constitute
a spendthrift trust.117

In John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Watson (In re
Kincaid), the Ninth Circuit held that an ERISA-qualified Deferred Salary
Plan was a valid spendthrift trust under Oregon and Massachusetts law,119
thereby excluding the debtor's interest in the plan from her bankruptcy
estate.' 2° The court first determined that the plan was not self-settled since
it was created by the debtor's employer, not the debtor herself, and that the
debtor had no access to or control over the contributed funds. 12' It noted
that some courts had held a plan to be self-settled if the employee could
choose voluntarily to participate in the plan,' 2 but rejected that notion.
The Ninth Circuit then looked to "the amount of 'dominion and control'
exercised by the debtor over the trust property" in order to determine whether
the plan at issue created a valid spendthrift trust.'2z It concluded that
Kincaid did not exercise enough control over the plan to remove it from the
ambit of a traditional spendthrift trust, despite the fact that the debtor could
124
receive her interest in the plan upon termination of her employment,

117. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
118. 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990).

119. Although the plan provided that it was to be governed by Massachusetts law,
a question was raised by the court below as to whether Massachusetts had a sufficient
nexus to the parties or the transaction so that the choice of law provision in the plan
could be honored. The court in Kincaid,however, did not address the choice of law
issue since both Massachusetts and Oregon law reached the same conclusion on the
spendthrift trust issue. Id. at 1167 n.2.
120. Id. at 1168.
121. Had the plan been self-seftled, the court recognized that under both Oregon
and Massachusetts law, a valid spendthrift trust could not have existed.' Id at 1167.
122. Id. (citing fi re Cafes, 73 Bankr. 874, 876 n.3 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987); In re
Sanders, 89 Bankr. 266, 270 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988)). Accord In re Davis, 125 Bankr.
242, 245 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991).
123. Kincaid,917 F.2d at 1167 (quoting In re Kaplan, 97 Bankr. 572,577 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1989)). See also In re Jones, 43 Bankr. 1002, 1006 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1984)
(the court held that in order to establish a valid spendthrift trust, the debtor had to
prove, among other facts, that "the debtor-beneficiary has no present dominion or
control over the plan corpus").
124. The court stated: "While it is true that termination of one's job is often in
one's own hands, it would be a rather drastic step to take for the purpose of obtaining
funds in the Plan." Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1168. Accord In re Zabelski, 81 Bankr. 89,
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borrow from the plan, 1' 2 and obtain funds from the plan for hardship.' 26
The court thus held that the debtor's interest in the plan was not property of
her bankruptcy estate, stating: "[w]e are confirmed in this position by the
knowledge that it attenuates the clash between ERISA and bankruptcy law,

and thus helps prevent27 our legal system from becoming a mere farrago of
unrelated provisions."
Numerous other courts have concluded that the ERISA-qualified
retirement plans at issue were valid spendthrift trusts, thus excluding plan
benefits from a debtor's bankruptcy estate.1'2 Some courts, however, have
accorded spendthrift treatment only to that portion of the retirement plan
consisting of employer contributions. 129 Reasoning that the portion of the

90 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1988). But see In re Silldorff, 96 Bankr. 859, 864 (C.D. Ill.
1989); In re Hartman, 115 Bankr. 171, 175 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990), in which courts
have held that a debtor's ability to access funds in a pension plan by terminating
employment gave the debtors sufficient control over plan assets to deny spendthrift
trust status to the plans at issue. For other district court cases reaching the same result,
see In re Green, 123 Bankr. 327, 329 (W.D. Mo. 1990); Employee Benefits Comm.
v. Tabor (In re Cress), 121 Bankr. 1006 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990), aff'd, 127 Bankr.
194, 200 (S.D. Ind. 1991).
125. According to the court, if a loan has to be repaid with interest, and if the
administrator of the plan is not required to make the loan to the participant, then most
courts have held that the loan provision in the plan does not destroy the status of the
plan as a spendthrift trust. Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1168 (citing In re Hysick, 90 Bankr.
770, 776-77 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) and In re West, 81 Bankr. 22, 25 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1987)). In Kincaid, the debtor was required to repay any loan from the plan with
interest, and the administrator could decide whether or not to make the loan in his sole
discretion. Finally, the plan specifically provided that "[t]his provision shall not be
used as a means of distributing benefits before they otherwise become payable." All
of these factors aided the court in its determination that the ability of Kincaid to obtain
a loan from the plan did not destroy its spendthrift character. Kincaid, 917 F.2d at
1168. But see In re Bloom, 839 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1988), where a debtor's
interest in her retirement plan was found exempt despite the fact that the debtor
borrowed over half of the funds in her retirement plan without security.
126. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the hardship provision did not destroy the
status of the plan as a spendthrift trust because it was discretionary and very limited
in nature.. The court pointed to the fact that the debtor's hardship petition was denied
in this case as an example of the restrictive nature of the hardship provision in the
plan. Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1168.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., In re LeFeber, 906 F.2d 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Taylor, 84
Bankr. 159, 161 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988). For an extensive compilation of cases
holding that an ERISA-qualified pension plan constituted a valid spendthrift trust under
applicable state law, see Koger & Goucher, supra note 85, at 18-19.
129. See, e.g., In re Tisdale, 112 Bankr. 61, 65 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990); In re
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plan consisting of employee contributions is a self-settled plan, these courts
have bifurcated employer and employee contributions; they hold the employer
portion a valid spendthrift trust, if all other requirements for spendthrift
treatment are met, while holding the employee portion to be self-settled, and
therefore not a valid spendthrift trust.13 Accordingly, these courts have

excluded the employer's contributions from the debtor's bankruptcy estate but
have included the debtor/employee's contributions in his estate for the benefit
of creditors.
The majority of courts considering this issue, however, have held that the
relevant ERISA plan did not rise to the level of a spendthrift trust under
applicable state law. Generally, they have based their decisions upon the
degree of the debtor's control over plan assets. For example, their decisions
3
in In re Lichstrahl,1
1 the Eleventh Circuit denied spendthrift status to two
pension plans established by a professional association in which the debtor
was the sole director, officer, and stockholder. Although the plans contained
anti-alienation provisions required by ERISA, they gave the professional
association the power to amend or terminate them. 32
The court looked to Florida law, the governing state law, and determined
that it defined a spendthrift trust as one which is:
created with a view of providing a fund for the maintenance of another, and
at the same time securing it against his own improvidence or incapacity for
self-protection. The provisions against alienation of the trust fund by the
voluntary act of the beneficiary, or invitum by his creditors, are the usual
incidents of suchtrusts."'
The court determined that because the debtor could amend or terminate the
plans as agent of the professional association, he enjoyed dominion and
control over the plan assets, and, therefore, the plans were not valid spendthrift trusts. Not allowing substance to prevail over form, the court found it

Elsea, 47 Bankr. 142, 146-47 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985). Some courts haVe even held
that if a plan participant has the option of making contributions to the plan, the entire
plan is self-settled and, therefore, cannot be a spendthrift trust. In re Davis, 125

Bankr. 242, 246 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991); In re Smith, 124 Bankr. 787, 790 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1991).
130. Tisdale, 112 Bankr. at 65; In re Cates, 73 Bankr. 874, 877 (Bankr. D. Or.
1987); In re Bemdt, 34 Bankr. 515, 517 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983). See also Davis, 125

Bankr. at 246.
131. 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985).
132. Id. at 1489.
133. Id. at 1490 (quoting Croom v. Ocala Plumbing & Elec. Co., 62 Fla. 460,
465, 57 So. 243, 244 (1911)).
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irrelevant that the debtor was not the settlor of the plans, since he had
complete control over the professional association that was the settlor.
While many courts have denied spendthrift treatment to self-settled
other courts have refused to find the existence of a
pension plans,"
spendthrift trust even in instances in which the debtor exercised far less
control over plan assets. In Brooks v. Interfirst Bank, Fort Worth (In re
Brooks)," 5 for example, the Fifth Circuit held that a debtor's ERISAqualified profit-sharing plan was not a valid spendthrift trust where the debtor
was one of thirty-two doctors who participated in the plan through an
association, and from time to -time sat on a board of directors that made
decisions regarding the pension plan. Although it did not articulate the
reasons for its decision, the court implied that the plan was self-settled, despite
the fact that the debtor was not a member of the association when it
established the plan. 136 Similarly, in In re Rodriguez,"37 the court held that
the debtor's right to receive his vested benefits upon termination of his
employment negated the existence of a spendthrift trust. Thus, even those
courts which espouse the majority view that "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
includes only traditional state spendthrift trust law have still reached vastly
whether pension plan benefits become part of
different conclusions regarding138
the debtor's bankruptcy estate.

134. See, e.g., Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 588 (5th Cir. 1983)
(debtors' self-settled Keogh plans could not be insulated from creditors as spendthrift
trusts because the debtors exercised considerable control over plan assets); In re
Hartman, 115 Bankr. 171, 174 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990) (a settlor cannot set up a selfsettled trust so that he can receive income as a beneficiary while also attempting to
protect trust assets from creditors); In re Dickson, 114 Bankr. 740, 742 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1990) ("the spendthrift provisions of a self-settled trust of which the settlor is
also the beneficiary are not enforceable"); In re Tisdale, 112 Bankr. 61, 65 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1990) (a spendthrift clause in a self-settled trust is void as a matter of public
policy).
135. 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988).
136. It is possible that the court relied in part on the fact that the plan allowed the
participant to reach plan assets upon termination of employment after three years, or
that a participant could request a loan from the plan for "hardship," in reaching its
decision. Id. at 260. It is even more likely that the decision was based in part on the
fact that the debtor's vested balance in his plan account reached $645,123.09 while his
bankruptcy proceeding was still pending. Id.
137. 82 Bankr. 74, 76 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987). See also supra note 124.
138. Some states have attempted to create uniformity in the treatment of
retirement benefits in bankruptcy by enacting statutes that provide that ERISAqualified retirement plans constitute spendthrift trusts under state law. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110, para. 12-1006 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2308 (Supp.
1990). At least one Illinois bankruptcy court has held Illinois' provision to be
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C. In re Moore: .The Minority View
Although the Eighth Circuit's view in Graham has been adopted by a
majority of other circuits, it was recently rejected by the Fourth Circuit in
Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore).139 The court in Moore found that the
phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" referred -not only to state law
(primarily state spendthrift trust law) but also to federal law. Including federal
law within the ambit of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" thus excluded plans
qualifying under ERISA from the bankruptcy estate.Y4
Moore involved a group of debtors who participated in a comprehensive
retirement program through their employer. The debtors' retirement plans
contained an anti-assignment provision which prohibited the alienation of the
employees' interests in the plans, thus qualifying the plans under the terms of
ERISA. Under the plans, employees could receive their vested benefits only
upon retirement, disability, or termination of their employment. The trustee
brought suit against the administrator of the plans, claiming that the plans did
not qualify as spendthrift trusts under South Carolina law, and, therefore, the
proceeds of the plans were required to be turned over to the debtors'
bankruptcy estates. 4'
The bankruptcy court held that because the plans qualified under ERISA,
they were excluded from the debtors' bankruptcy estates under section
541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 42 The bankruptcy court found that
whether the plans also 43
qualified as state spendthrift trusts was irrelevant. The
district court affirmed.
In its decision, the Fourth Circuit focused on the interpretation of
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" under section 541(c)(2) and rejected the
trustee's argument that the language referred only to retirement plans with
restrictions on transfer or alienation enforceable under state spendthrift trust
law. The court found the language to be broad, determined that the provision
included both federal and state laws recognizing transfer restrictions as
enforceable,' 44 and found no contradictory limiting language in the statute.

unconstitutional. See In re Wimmer, 121 Bankr. 539, 543 (Bankr. C.D. Il1.1990),
aff'd, No. 91-1021 (C.D. I11.July 19,1991) (WESTLAW, FBKR-CS database). Thus,
whether these statutes will, in fact, create uniformity is doubtful.
139. 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990). For a discussion of the Moore decision, see
Note, A Debtor's Interest in ERISA Funds as Property of the Estate: A Question of
Statutory Interpretation,56 Mo. L. REv. 787 (1991).
140. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1476-78.
141. Id. at 1476-77.
142. Id. at 1476.
143. Id. Neither the bankruptcy nor the district court opinion is published.
144. Id. at 1477. The court stated:
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In attempting to define the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law," the
Fourth Circuit looked not only to its plain meaning, but also examined the
definition that was attributed to the same phrase when used elsewhere in the
Bankruptcy Code. 4 s For example, the court cited section 1125(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code,"~ which sets forth certain requirements for disclosure
statements, and found that the language "not governed by any otherwise
applicable nonbankruptcy law" in that provision included the federal securities
laws. 47 Additionally, the court noted that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in section 108(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (dealing with extensions
of time for a trustee to bring a: cause of action which the debtor could have
brought) has been held to encompass the tolling provisions of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, among other statutes."'

Because

identical words are to be given the same meaning wheii found within.the same
statute, 49 the court in Moore reasoned that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" must include federal as well as state law wherever that-phrase is
found in the Bankruptcy Code, including the exclusionary provisions of
section 541(c)(2).
The court further reasoned that, when the drafters of the Bankruptcy
Code intended a statutory reference to include only state law, the term "state
law" rather than "applicable nonbankruptcy law" was used.150 The court
also pointed out that the drafters would have used the phrase "state spendthrift
trust law" or "traditional spendthrift trusts" if their intent had been to exclude

"Applicable nonbankruptcy law" means precisely what it says: all laws,
state and federal, under which a transfer restriction is enforceable. Nothing
in the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" or in the remainder of
§ 541(c)(2) suggests that the phrase refers exclusively to state law, much
less to state spendthrift trust law.
Id.
145. Id.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1988).
147. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1477-78 (citing In re Stanley Hotel, Inc., 13 Bankr. 926,
931 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981)).
148. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478 (citing In re Ahead By a Length, Inc., 100 Bankr.
157, 162-63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
149. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478 (quoting Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 461 U.S. 624, 633 (1983)).
150. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478. The court in Moore pointed tb examples, such as
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) ("state law"), 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)-(2) (1988) ("state law that
is applicable"), and 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988) ("made in accordance with state and
territorial law"), all of which show explicit references to "state law," where it was the
intended source. See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(12), 903(1), 1145(a) (1988).
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from a debtor's bankruptcy estate only those plans qualifying as spendthrift
trusts.

The Fourth Circuit recognized that other courts had narrowly read the
phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to include only state spendthrift trust
law, but it specifically refused to follow those decisions. The court emphasized that the majority of courts holding that state spendthrift trust law was the
proper interpretation of the statute did so by looking to the legislative history
of section 541(c)(2).u 2 The court in Moore refused to resort to legislative
history when the language of the statute was clear. 3 Moreover, the court
determined that, even if it turned to the legislative history to assist in its
decision, the legislative history was inconclusive. According to the court in
Moore, the repeated references to state spendthrift trust law in the House and
Senate Reports only suggested that Congress intended spendthrift trust law to
fall within the purview of "applicable nonbankruptcy law," and did not mean
that the phrase was limited exclusively to spendthrift trust law. 3 4
Finally, the Fourth Circuit considered whether ERISA contained
enforceable transfer restrictions which would bring the statute within the ambit
of "applicable nonbankruptcy law." After examining the policies of ERISA,
the court concluded that its overriding purpose was to protect an employee's
retirement benefits. 5 5 The court stated that "ERISA ensures that 'if a
worker has been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement-and if
he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit-he will actually receive it."" 6 The court reviewed ERISA's antialienation provisions and noted that relevant case law has interpreted those
provisions as preventing both voluntary and involuntary transfers of vested
benefits. Because ERISA prohibits a debtor's creditors from reaching his
vested pension benefits, the court in Moore held that ERISA constitutes
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" with enforceable transfer restrictions.
Accordingly, the debtors' pension benefits were excluded from their

151. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478.
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1500, 1504 n.3
(1989) ("Legislative history is irrelevant to the interpretation of an unambiguous
statute"); Burlington Northern R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461
(1987) (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) ("unless exceptional
circumstances dictate otherwise, '[w]hen we find the terms of a statute unambiguous,
judicial inquiry is complete"'))).
154. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1479.
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359,
375 (1980)).
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bankruptcy estates. 5 7 In its discussion, the court noted that the beneficiaries
of the retirement plans had no control over plan assets and could not borrow
against the plans. It is unclear whether these factors affected the outcome of
the decision.
The Fourth Circuit further justified its decision on two policy grounds.
First, the court's holding ensured "that the security of employee retirement
benefits will not depend on the particularities of state spendthrift trust
law."" s A contrary holding, the court reasoned, would elevate state law
above ERISA's anti-alienation provisions, in direct contradiction to ERISA's
preemption of state law. 9 Second, the court emphasized that its holding
would prevent ERISA-qualified pension plans from risking the loss of their

tax-exempt status when plan benefits were included in the debtor's bankruptcy
estate in violation of the pldn's anti-alienation provisions. 16° The Moore
decision did not address the exemption issue raised in Graham.
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the Fourth Circuit's holding in Moore in
Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas).'6 1 Lucas involved a debtor's interest in an
employee benefit plan which allegedly met the requirements of both ERISA
and the Internal Revenue Code. The bankruptcy court held that the plan was
not excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy estate and found that the trustee
could recover the pension assets for the benefit of the estate.' 62 The district
court affirmed.' 63
The Sixth Circuit examined the circuit court decisions reaching differing
conclusions as to whether pension plan assets should be included in a
bankruptcy estate. While acknowledging that the majority of circuits had
included such assets in the estate, the court found the minority view followed
by the Fourth Circuit in Moore to be the better reasoned analysis. In reaching
its decision, the court relied on the axiom of statutory construction that it is
improper to resort to legislative history when a statute is unambiguous."
The court found the language of section 541(c)(2) to be clear and unambiguous and, therefore, any analysis of the provision's legislative history was

157. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1480.
158. Id.

159. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). See also infra notes
258-93 and accompanying text.
160. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1480-81.
161. 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991).
162. Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 100 Bankr. 969 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989).
163. Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 110 Bankr. 335 (M.D. Tenn. 1989).
164. Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597, 600 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 2275 (1991).
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improper. The Sixth Circuit, like the Fourth Circuit before it, found that the
legislative history was inconclusive, even if it were deemed relevant.1 65
The court in Lucas examined the language in ERISA and the Bankruptcy
Code in order to give full effect to both federal statutes. 1" It found that the
purpose behind ERISA was to insure that "employees and their beneficiaries
would not be deprived of anticipated retirement benefits by the termination of
pension plans before sufficient funds have been accumulated in the plans,"'167
One of ERISA's methods of protecting an employee's retirement benefits was
to prohibit assignment of those benefits through its anti-alienation provisions.'"s The court in Lucas reasoned that, once a plan complied with
ERISA, both voluntary and involuntary encroachments on the employee's
benefits were forbidden. Accordingly, the debtor's interest in his pension plan
was found
to be outside the reach of both general creditors and the bankruptcy
169
trustee.
The Sixth Circuit cited several advantages to a rule of law finding
pensions qualifying under ERISA to be outside the bankruptcy estate. First,
such a result harmonized the Bankruptcy Code with ERISA and the Internal
Revenue Code. Second, it prevented a plan from losing its qualified taxexempt status when a single debtor's interest in an ERISA plan was turned
over to the bankruptcy trustee. Finally, the result guaranteed, uniform
treatment of pension benefits. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the
case to determine if the plan in dispute constituted a pension plan under
ERISA.1 70
The concurring opinion by Judge Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit in John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Watson (In re Kincaid)17' also

supports the holdings of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits. Judge Fletcher
disagreed with the analysis of the majority, which found that a retirement plan
qualified under ERISA was included in the bankruptcy estate unless it also
qualified as a state spendthrift trust. Judge Fletcher argued that ERISA itself

165. Id. at 602.
166. Id. (citingMoore,907 F.2d at 1479 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
551 (1974))).

167. Lucas, 924 F.2d at 602 (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.,
475 U.S. 211, 214 (1984)).
168. Lucas, 924 F.2d at 602. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988 & Supp. I
1989).
169. Lucas, 924 F.2d at 603.
170. Id.
171. 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990). The opinion of the majority held that while
pensions that qualify under ERISA are not automatically excluded from the bankruptcy
estate, the particular plan at issue in Kincaid was excluded from the debtor's estate

because it met the definition of a spendthrift trust under state law. Id. at 1186.
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should protect a pension plan from inclusion in the bankruptcy estate. He,
too, raised the concern that, by failing to exclude ERISA-qualified plans from
a debtor's bankruptcy estate, the plans could be disqualified under ERISA and
Judge Fletcher concluded that it was
lose their tax-exempt status.'
"unthinkable that Congress intended to eviscerate in this manner so much of
the protection granted benefit plans under ERISA."M

D. Issues Left Unanswered by Moore and Lucas
While no other courts of appeals have yet adopted the reasoning in
Moore and Lucas, a number of bankruptcy courts and at least one district
court have reached decisions consistent with these holdings. 74 In one such
case, In re Wyles,'75 a bankruptcy court in the Fourth Circuit responded to
an issue left unanswered in the Moore decision.
1. In re Wyles: Application of Moore to a Self-Settled Trust
Wyles involved a doctor who formed a corporation that adopted ERISAqualified pension plans. Wyles alone controlled the corporation and acted as
trustee of the plans. He borrowed money from one of the plans on at least

172. Id. at 1169-70.
173. Id. at 1170.
174. See In re Carver, No. 91-3041-CV-S-4 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 1991)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds database) (debtors' interests in defined contribution plans were
excluded from their bankruptcy estates based upon the Supreme Court's holding in
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680 (1990)); In re
Suarez, 127 Bankr. 73 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) (debtor's IRA's and Keogh plans were
excluded from the bankruptcy estate because ERISA constituted "applicable
nonbankruptcy law"); In re Wyles, 123 Bankr. 733 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991) (self-settled
trust was excepted from bankruptcy estate; debtor was enjoined from receiving a
distribution from pension plan until age 59 1/2); In re Idalski, 123 Bankr. 222 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1991) (benefits payable'from an ERISA-qualified plan were excluded from
the debtor's estate under § 541(c)(2)); In re Leamon, 121 Bankr. 974 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1990) (phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" is broad enough to include
Internal Revenue Code's anti-alienation provisions; In re Ridenour, 45 Bankr. 72
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) is overruled); In re Cheaver, 121 Bankr. 665 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1990) (debtor's interest in ERISA-qualified retirement plan was excluded from debtor's
estate under § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code; the fact that the debtor could reach
plan benefits by terminating her employment was deemed irrelevant); In re Majul, 119
Bankr. 118 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (pension benefits were excluded from the
debtors' bankruptcy estates under the reasoning in Moore; result prevents plans from
losing their tax-exempt status).
175. 123 Bankr. 733 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991).
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one occasion and amended the plans several times. At the time that Wyles
and his wife filed a joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, Wyles was the
beneficiary of approximately 72% of the plans' assets.176
The Wyles case presented the issue of whether a self-settled trust 1 77 was
controlled by the rationale of the Moore decision. Because the court in Moore
noted that the beneficiaries did not have any control over plan assets and had
no power to borrow against the assets of or to amend the plans, it appears that
these factors may have been significant in the court disposing of the case in

the manner in which it did. Thus, the Wyles court suggested that the Fourth
Circuit may have reached a different conclusion in Moore had a self-settled
trust been present instead.' 78
The court in Wyles concluded that the debtor's pension benefits should
not be included in his bankruptcy estate despite the fact that the debtor
controlled the ERISA plans at issue and could access the funds in the plans
at any time. The court provided three separate justifications for its decision.
First, although Wyles had a large degree of control over plan assets, the court
found no showing that Wyles established or maintained the plans in an effort
to defraud his creditors. Rather, the plans were merely vehicles to provide
retirement benefits to Wyles and his employees. 79 Moreover, a holding that
closely-held corporations cannot effectively place retirement assets beyond the
reach of creditors in bankruptcy would have a significant adverse impact on
such corporations. Not only would myriad plans be cancelled, but creditors
would use the procedure of involuntary bankruptcy in order to reach the
pension benefits of owners of closely-held corporations as well as professional
corporations. 8' Finally, many plans could face the loss of their tax-exempt
status. According to the court, all of these consequences run contrary to the
policy goals articulated in Moore of "insuring uniformity of law, not allowing
pension assets to be reached through an involuntary proceeding, and not
allowing an entire plan to be disqualified through the attachment of the
interest of a single beneficiary."'8 1

176. Id. at 734.
177. Although the trust and plans involved in Wyles were not technically in the
nature of a self-settled trust, see supra note 73, cases that have involved similar trusts,
in which the settlor of the trust was a corporation whose sole shareholder and the
person who controlled the corporation was also the beneficiary of the trust, have
consistently held that such trusts should be treated as self-settled trusts. See, e.g., In
re O'Brien, 94 Bankr. 583, 587 (W.D. Mo. 1988); In re Ott, 69 Bankr. 1, 2 (D. Or.
1986).
178. Wyles, 123 Bankr. at 735.
179. Id.

180. Id. at 736.
181. Id. at 735-36.
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The court in Wyles handled the issue of the debtor's ability to reach plan
assets after bankruptcy in a most creative manner. It enjoined the trustee of
the plans from making any distributions to the debtor or his assignees without
prior court approval until the debtor reached age fifty-nine and one-half.
Moreover, the court enjoined the corporation's- directors from amending the
plans without court approval. Finally, it provided that if any violation of these
injunctions occurred, the bankruptcy case would be reopened and the debtor's
82
pension assets would be made available for distribution to his creditors.'
Although the Wyles court's holding would guard against a debtor's misuse of
plan assets, it would also place a significant administrative burden on
bankruptcy judges, who would be forced to retain jurisdiction over all
bankruptcy proceedings involving self-settled retirement plans.
2. The Conflict Between Section 541(c)(2)
and the Exemption Provisions
One troubling issue raised by the Eighth Circuit in Graham was why
Congress would provide for the exemption of pension benefits from. the
bankruptcy estate if they were already excluded from the estate under section
541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.183 Neither Moore nor Lucas addressed
this issue. In In re Majul,14 however, a Texas bankruptcy court recently
concluded that two debtors' interests in ERISA-qualified pension and profitsharing plans were excluded from the debtors' bankruptcy estates under the
reasoning in Moore. The court squarely confronted the exclusion/exemption
issue raised by other courts. Majul rejected the other courts' contention that
there was an inconsistency between excluding certain pension benefits from
the bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2) and exempting certain pension
benefits out of the estate under section 522(b)(10)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code.
It stated:
Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts the right to receive payments necessary for
support from a wide range of sources, tax-qualified or not, including, for
example, Christmas stock bonuses paid upon 25 years of service, or profitsharing plans restricted to senior employees, or an annuity purchased to
provide income to a worker disabled in an industrial accident. The Court
does not consider it remarkable that Congress did not bother to further

182. Id. at 736. The court stated that it would rule favorably on a request to

amend the plans to keep them in compliance with ERISA and the Internal Revenue
Code. Id.

183. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
184. 119 Bankr. 118 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
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complicate an already complex code by taking pains to insure that there was
no overlap between Section 522(d)(10)(E) and Section 541(c)(2). 1 5
The bankruptcy court in Majul concluded that any possible overlap in the
exemption and exclusion provisions of the Bankruptcy Code should not be
construed as evidence of any Congressional intent that retirement benefits
should be included in a debtor's bankruptcy estate. 186
IV.

EXEMPTING RETIREMENT PLAN ASSETS OUT OF THE BANKRUPTCY

ESTATE: THE BANKRUPTCY CODE'S DUAL EXEMPTION
SCHEME AND ERISA's PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW

As illustrated in the discussion above, there are two ways in which a
debtor can retain her vested pension benefits in bankruptcy. The first way is
to exclude them from the bankruptcy estate. Under the majority view, this is
generally accomplished by demonstrating that the ERISA plan constitutes a
spendthrift trust under applicable state law. Under the minority view, the
debtor must prove only that the plan contains enforceable restrictions on
transfer or alienation, even if it does not rise to the level of a spendthrift trust.
If the debtor is successful under either view, then she is entitled to retain all
of her pension benefits, and they are placed beyond the reach of creditors in
bankruptcy.
If a debtor cannot succeed in excluding retirement benefits from her
bankruptcy estate, a second way in which she can attempt to retain at least a
portion of the benefits is to exempt them out of the estate." 7 When it
enacted the Bankruptcy Code, Congress departed significantly from the old
Bankruptcy Act by providing a debtor a choice between two exemption
schemes: the exemption system established by the debtor's state of residence
or the federal exemption scheme.s
185. Id. at 123 (quoting In re Threewitt, 24 Bankr. 927, 930 (D. Kan. 1982)).
186. Majul, 119 Bankr. at 123. For another bankruptcy court decision reaching
a similar conclusion, see In re Cheaver, 121 Bankr. 665, 665-66 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1990)
("Not all ERISA-qualified plans (e.g., a church plan) need include an anti-assignment
clause and this destroys the trustee's argument that 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)
evidences an intention that ERISA plan interests are always estate property unless
qualifying as state law spendthrift trusts.").
187. The term "exemption" has been defined as "a right given by law to allow a
debtor to retain a portion of their personal property free from seizure and sale by their
creditors under judicial process." In re Komet, 104 Bankr. 799, 806 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1989) (citing Clark v. Nirenbaum, 8 F.2d 451, 452 (5th Cir. 1925), cert. denied,
270 U.S. 649 (1926)).
188. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 360, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6316. See also 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
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A. The Bankruptcy Code's Dual Exemption Scheme
Although all property not specifically excluded by statute is included

initially in the debtor's bankruptcy estate,' 89 the debtor is afforded an
opportunity to remove certain property from the estate before creditors' claims
are satisfied.'" The property that the debtor can exempt is generally that
property considered necessary for the debtor's survival after bankruptcy. This
"exempt" property facilitates one of the major policies of the Bankruptcy Code
by providing an honest debtor a fresh start after bankruptcy.' 9'
The amount and type of property that a debtor can exempt from his

bankruptcy estate is determined by the exemption provisions applicable to that
debtor. There are two possible exemption regimes. First, the Bankruptcy
Code provides a set of federal exemption categories.'9 Alternatively, the
debtor's state of residence may have established its own set of exemptions and
immunities that may or may not be similar to those exemptions established
under the federal scheme. 193 The Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to

189. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
190. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
191. See supranotes 55-56 and accompanying text. For an outstanding discussion
of the concept of the fresh start in bankruptcy, see Jackson, The Fresh-StartPolicy in
Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1985).
192. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988). The federal exemption scheme provides dollar
limits for certain exemption categories, such as $7,500 for the debtor's homestead,
$1,200 in value for one motor vehicle, $4,000 in clothing and furniture, $500 in
jewelry, and $750 for tools of the debtor's trade. Id. Additionally, certain exemption
categories contain reasonability limits, such as pension and profit-sharing plan
payments, wrongful death payments, and life insurance contract payments which are
reasonably necessary for the debtor's and his dependents' support, while other
categories contain no dollar limits at all, such as health aids and social security,
disability, and support benefits. Id. One exemption category, referred to as the

"wildcard," allows a debtor to exempt up to $400 (plus up to $3,750 of any unused

amount of the homestead exemption) in any property, including property that does not
fall within any specific exemption category. Id.
193. In fact, one of the primary reasons Congress adopted a federal exemption
scheme was because many states had not amended their exemption statutes in years,
making them out of date and "unnecessarily parsimonious," In re Komet, 104 Bankr.

799, 812 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), thereby depriving debtors of their fresh start. The
House Report to section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code states:
[S]ome State exemption laws have not been revised in this century. Most
are outmoded, designed for more rural times, and hopelessly inadequate to
serve the needs of and provide a fresh start for modem urban debtors. The
historical purpose of these exemption laws has been to protect a debtor

from his creditors, to provide him with the basic necessities of life so that
even if his creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will
HeinOnline -- 56 Mo. L. Rev. 527 1991

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

forego the federal bankruptcy exemptions and instead choose to exempt
property specified under his state's exemption scheme, together with property
that is exempt under federaf law other than the Bankruptcy Code's exemption
provisions (often referred to as "federal nonbankruptcy exemptions")." The

Bankruptcy Code has provided states the opportunity to "opt out" of the
federal exemption scheme; 195

thus, debtors who live in states that have

not be left destitute and a public charge. The purpose has not changed, but
neither have the level of exemptions in many states. Thus, the-purpose has
largely been defeated .... [The Bankruptcy Code] adopts the position that
there is a Federal interest in seeing that the debtor that goes through
bankruptcy comes out with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong, 2d Sess. 126, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6087.
194. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A)-(B) (1988) provides that a debtor who chooses to
forego the federal exemption scheme can instead exempt:
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than
subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the
date of the filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor's domicile
has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the
filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in
any other place; and
(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately
before the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety
or joint tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety or
joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankmptcy law.

Id.
For a discussion of the types of property that would be exempt under "other"
federal law, see infra notes 226-57 and accompanying text.
195. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1988). There are currently thirty-six states that have
opted out of the federal exemption scheme. Those states' opt-out provisions can be
found in the following statutes: ALA. CODE § 6-10-11 (Supp. 1990); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.38.055 (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1133(B) (1990); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 703.130 (West 1987); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-107 (1987); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 4914(a) (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.20 (West 1989); GA.
CODE ANN. § 44-13-100(b) (Michie 1990); IDAHO CODE § 11-609 (1990); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-1201 (Smith-Hurd 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-28-0.5
(Bums 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.10 (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 602312 (Supp. 1990) (statute does, however, permit exemptions under 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(10) in addition to the state exemptions); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.170
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881 (West 1991); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4426 (Supp. 1990); MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 11-504 (1989); MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-3-2 (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.427
(Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-2-106 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2515,105 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21.090(3) (Michie 1987); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 511:2-a (1983); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 282 (McKinney 1990); N.C.
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opted out must use the exemption and immunity provisions established by that
state, together with other federal nonbankruptcy exemption provisions.
Debtors in other states can choose either the federal scheme or the state
scheme, but not both.'9
Exemption schemes vary dramatically from state to state. Not all states
impose dollar limits on categories of exempt items; rather, the limitations may
be based on characteristics other than monetary value. A prime example of
this is the homestead. While some states provide that the debtor can retain a
certain dollar amount of equity in the debtor's home,' 9 other states limit
the homestead not by dollar value, but instead by acreage. 98 Consequently,
whether a debtor chooses the Bankruptcy Code's federal exemption scheme

GEN. STAT. § 1C-1601(f) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE §28-22-17 (Supp. 1989); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.662 (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1(B)

(West 1991); OR. REv. STAT. § 23.305 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-35 (Law Coop 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-31-30 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2112 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-15 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 34-3.1 (1990);
W. VA. CODE § 38-10-4 (1985); WYO. STAT. § 1-20-109 (1990).
196. Section 522(b) provides that "[n]otwithstanding section 541 of this title, an
individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property listed in either
paragraph (1) [the federal exemption scheme] or, in the alternative,paragraph (2) [the
state exemption scheme] of this subsection." 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988) (emphasis
added). That section also provides that where a husband and wife file a joint
bankruptcy petition under § 302 of the Bankruptcy Code or whose individual petitions
are jointly administered under Rule 1015(b) of the Bankruptcy Rules, they must both
elect either the federal or the state exemption scheme. In such circumstances, one
spouse cannot choose the federal scheme while the other elects the state scheme. See

11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
197. For example, Missouri allows a debtor to exempt up to $8,000 of equity in
the debtor's home, Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.475 (1986), while Wisconsin is more
generous, allowing a debtor to exempt up to $40,000 in equity. WIs. STAT. § 815.20
(1990).
198. Minnesota, for example, chooses to limit its homestead exemption based on
acreage and allows every urban debtor'the same quantity of land regardless of the
quality or value of the home that is built on that acreage. Rural debtors are permitted
to exempt more acreage. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.01-510.09 (West 1990). See also
In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. 1989), in which the Supreme Court of

Minnesota upheld the constitutionality of Minnesota's homestead exemption.
Texas has a similar scheme, limiting the homestead exemption by acreage. The
Texas statute also differentiates between the urban homestead, which is limited to one
acre, and the rural homestead, which is limited to 100 acres for a single debtor. TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon Supp. 1991). Thus, whether a debtor in Texas

owns a one bedroom shack or a Southfork-style ranch, so long as both properties meet
the definition of a homestead under Texas law, both would be exempt under the same
provision regardless of value.
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or his state's scheme will depend primarily upon two factors: (i) whether the
debtor's state of residence is an "opt-out" state, and, if not, (ii) which system
allows the debtor to retairi more property for his fresh start. One court
summarized the choice between the federal and state exemption schemes best
when it stated:
Section 522(b) permits a bankrupt a choice between a "federal" or
"state" exemption system. The debtor may elect to exempt either as the
"federal" exemption the property set out in subsection (d)of Section 522 of
the Code, or as the "state" exemptions the property specified. as exempted
under the law of his domicile, plus property exempted by "Federal law,
other than subsection (d)." The election choice of federal versus state
exemptions is the debtor's to make. The choice, obviously, will hinge upon
the debtor's individual assessment of which exemption system would permit
him to retain a larger share of his assets. This decision, in turn, win often
depend upon the type of property held by the debtor, as state exemptions
may vary in kind as well as degree from the federal bankruptcy exemptions. 199
A debtor whose pension benefits are included in his bankruptcy estate
may thus be able to exempt them out of the estate under one of three possible
exemption provisions: the Bankruptcy Code's federal exemption scheme; a
federal nonbankruptcy exemption; or the domiciliary state's exemption
provisions. The discussion which follows will examine the substantial body
of case law that has developed under each of these options.
B. Exempting Retirement Benefits Under the
Bankruptcy Code's FederalExemption Scheme
A debtor in bankruptcy who chooses the Bankruptcy Code's federal
exemption scheme rather than the exemption scheme established in the
debtor's state of residene2w can exempt retirement benefits out of the estate
under section 522(d)(10)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code only to the extent that
they are reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any of the
debtor's dependents. 2°1 There is not a significant body of case law analyz-

199. Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 579 (5th Cir. 1983) (footnotes
omitted).
200. Of course, this option is only available if the state has not opted out of the
federal exemption scheme. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
201. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988). For the exact language of this section,
see supra text accompanying note 106.
A debtor cannot exempt any retirement benefits out of his bankruptcy estate,
however, if all three of the following conditions are met: (1)the plan was established
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ing the "reasonably necessary for support" standard under section
522(d)(10)(E), presumably because the vast majority of states have opted out
of the federal scheme.2
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code does not define
what is reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his dependents; 2°3 the legislative history of section 522(d)(10)(E), however, states that
the provision was added to exempt out of the estate "certain benefits that are
akin to future earnings of the debtor." 2 4 The legislative history also states
that the federal exemption scheme was derived in part from the Uniform
Exemptions Act, which was promulgated in 1976.' 0 The Uniform Exemptions Act provides some insight into the "reasonably necessary for support"
standard. It states:
[t]he phrase "property to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of
him and his dependents" means property required to meet the present and
anticipated needs of the individual and his dependents, as determined by the

by an insiderwho employed the debtor when the debtor's rights under the plan arose;
(2) payments due to the debtor under the plan are on account of age or length of
service; and (3) the plan is not qualified under sections 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408,
or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)(i)-(iii) (1988 & Supp.
I 1989) (emphasis added). See In re Miller, 33 Bankr. 549, 552 (Bankr. D. Minn.

1983).
Section 101(31)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code defines an insider to include a
"corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control." Thus, an
individual debtor employed by a corporation will be able to exempt any retirement
benefits reasonably necessary for his support unless he is a director or officer of the
corporation or is in control of the corporation and the retirement plan is not qualified
under the Internal Revenue Code.
The Internal Revenue Code sections enumerated in requirement three, above, refer
to the various types of qualified plans under the Code. Section 401(a) of the Code
generally refers to corporate or Keogh plans. Section 403(a) is the Code section
dealing with qualified annuity plans; section 403(b) governs annuities purchased by
exempt organizations or public schools; section 408 covers individual retirement
accounts; and section 409 governs a special form of retirement bond. See Seiden,
Chapter 7 Cases: Do ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code Conflict as to Whether a
Debtor'sInterest In or Rights Under a Qualified Plan Can Be Used to Pay Claims?
(pt. 2), 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 301, 304 (1987).
202. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
203. The Bankruptcy Code does, however, define a "dependent" for purposes of
§ 522 to include a spouse, whether or not that spouse is actually dependent upon the
debtor for support. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(1) (1988).
204. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 362, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS. 5963, 6318.
205. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 361, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS. 5963, 6317.
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court after consideration of the individual's responsibilities and all the
present and anticipated
property and income of the individual, including that
26
which is exempt. W
Because the Bankruptcy Code and its legislative history offer little
assistance in defining the "reasonably necessary for support" standard, courts
have been forced to interpret the standard on a case-by-case basis. Courts
have enumerated eleven factors to be considered in determining whether a
debtor's interest in a retirement plan is reasonably necessary for his or his
dependents' support:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

Debtor's present and anticipated living expenses;
Debtor's present and anticipated income from all sources;
Age of debtor and dependents;
Health of the debtor and dependents;
Debtor's ability to work and earn a living;
Debtor's job skills, training and education;
Debtor's other assets, including exempt assets;
Liquidity of other assets;
Debtor's ability to save for retirement;
Special needs of the debtor and dependents;
20 7
Debtor's financial obligations, e.g. alimony or support payments.

The factors enumerated above are not exhaustive, and, according to the
bankruptcy courts, no one factor is determinative.
In an Iowa case, a debtor attempted to exempt his retirement rights under
a Keogh plan, valued at $36,000, out of his bankruptcy estate. He claimed
that they were reasonably necessary for the support of his family, under an
Iowa exemption statute substantially similar to section 522(d)(10)(E). °8 The
debtor was fifty-eight, had three children, one who was a senior in high
school, and had a forty-eight-year-old wife who was partially disabled from
an automobile accident. The combined income of the family was approximately $10,000, and the debtor's wife required specialist care for a heart
condition at a cost of approximately $1,200 per year. The court found the
debtor's entire interest in his Keogh plan to be reasonably necessary for his
support and the support of his family. This finding was based upon his
income, the lack of prospects for substantial future earnings, and the fact that

206. UNIF. EXEMPTIONs Acr § 6(b), 13 U.L.A. 207, 224-25 (1986). See also
Seiden, supra note 201, at 305.
207. In re Hentzen, 126 Bankr. 600, 602 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991) (quoting In re
Flygstad, 56 Bankr. 884, 889-90 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986)). See also In re Davis, 125
Bankr. 242, 246-47 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991).
208. In re Lawrence, 57 Bankr. 727 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986).
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the debtor did not contribute any assets to the plan just prior to bankruptcy in
an effort to conceal assets from his creditors. In reaching its decision, the
court stated that "[i]f this bankruptcy proceeding involved a relatively young
professional, the withholding of sizable funds from creditors on mere
speculation as to financial needs at a distant retirement
age would raise a
20 9
natural disinclination to view the exemption favorably.
A Wisconsin bankruptcy court recently found a debtor's Individual
Retirement Account ("IRA"), which was valued at approximately $17,000,
reasonably .necessary for his support, based on several factors.210 First, at
the time of the exemption trial, the debtor was fifty-four years old; thus, his
ability to build a new pension prior to retirement was severely limited by his
age. Moreover, after trial the debtor died, leaving his wife little ability to save
for her retirement. Finally, the court noted that the party objecting to a
claimed exemption bears the burden of proving the exemption to be improper,

a burden which the objecting creditor did not meet."

In reaching its

determination, the bankruptcy court found irrelevant the fact that the debtor
exercised control over the funds in his IRA. According to the court, control
was only relevant in determining whether the IRA was included as property
of the bankruptcy estate, not whether the debtor had a right to exempt the IRA
to the extent reasonably necessary for his support. The court held that "just
as a claimed exemption for a homestead or a motor vehicle shall not be denied
because the debtor controls his house or his car, a claimed exemption
for an
212
IRA shall not be denied because the debtor controls his IRA.,
Although most cases, like those discussed above, appear to turn on the
debtor's age, some courts have recently begun to focus primarily on the
debtor's ability to rebuild a pension before retirement. For example, a Kansas
bankruptcy court recently allowed husband and wife debtors to exempt the
wife's entire interest in her pension plan, which was valued at approximately
$14,000, finding that the plan assets were reasonably necessary for their
support. 213 Even though the debtor was only thirty-eight years old and his
wife was only forty at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, the court
nevertheless determined that the pension assets were reasonably necessary for
their support because their combined monthly income was not enough to meet
their actual monthly expenses; thus, they had little ability to rebuild their
pension in the future.214 The court also took into consideration the fact that

209. Id. at 730.
210. Cilek v. Cilek (In re Cilek), 115 Bankr. 974, 990 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990).
211. Id. at 989 (citing Bankruptcy Rule 4003(c)).
212. Cilek, 115 Bankr. at 987. Contra In re Flygstad, 56 Bankr. 884, 890-91
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986).
213. In re Hentzen, 126 Bankr. 600, 603 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991).
214. Id. at 603. Accord In re Smith, 124 Bankr. 787, 791 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
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the husband had carpal tunnel syndrome and needed surgery but could not
afford it, as well as the fact that their fourteen-year-old daughter had
215
significant orthodontic bills.
Similarly, a Missouri bankruptcy court found a debtor's $43,000 interest6
21
in his employer's profit-sharing plan exempt from the reach of creditors.
In that case, the debtor was a forty-seven-year-old warehouse material handler
with a congenital blood disease for which there was no known cure. He was
married; his wife was unemployed, and the couple raised the wife's two minor
children from a prior marriage. The debtor had minimal assets, including a
pick-up truck and some household furnishings and clothing. He also had no
substantial prospects for additional income in the future. Based on these facts,
the court held that the debtor's entire interest in his retirement plan was
reasonably necessary for his support and the support of his family. According
to the court, taking away the debtor's retirement assets would "deny him the
217
'fresh start' envisioned by Congress."

1991) (debtors were found to have little monthly income with which to rebuild a
pension, based on their fixed expenses and the debtor's inability to earn excess income
in the future).
215. Hentzen, 126 Bankr. at 603.
216. In re Thompson, 103 Bankr. 205, 206-07 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
217. Id. at 206. In reaching its decision, the court stated:
Were debtor to have other assets, or longer to amass same, or have
substantial future income potential, or better health, or some other factor not
present, such factors might well dictate a different finding and conclusion;
it is for this reason that the Court has been careful to point out that such
cases are factually driven.
Id. at 206-07.
Injecting a bit of humor into its decision, the court hastened to point out that such
a case-by-case analysis "does create steady employment for lawyers and judges who
might otherwise find their services superfluous." Id. at 206.
For other cases holding that a debtor's retirement assets were reasonably
necessary for support, see In re Flygstad, 56 Bankr. 884, 891 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986)
(court determined that debtor's pension assets were reasonably necessary for support;
however, the record was insufficient to prove that assets in profit-sharing plan, valued
at $40,000, were necessary for support); In re Johnson, 36 Bankr. 54, 56 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1984) (47-year-old unemployed debtor with alimony expenses of $250 per
month was allowed to exempt retirement assets of $12,278 as reasonably necessary to
meet his basic needs); In re Miller, 33 Bankr. 549, 553 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983)
(decision was same as Flygstad);In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr. 677, 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1981) (62-year-old debtor with emphysema, caring for a spouse with cancer, was
permitted to exempt $22,000 in pension assets as reasonably necessary for the couple's
support).
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Of course, a number of cases have found a debtor's interest in his
retirement plan not to be reasonably necessary for his support. In In re
Kochell,218 the debtor was a forty-four-year-old medical doctor who worked
at a women's clinic in Wisconsin. He had amassed approximately $127,000
in retirement benefits prior to filing for bankruptcy. Additionally, Dr. Kochell
had $850,000 in life insurance coverage, which would also pay benefits upon
his total disability. His average monthly income was $36,000 and his average
monthly expenses were $34,000. The debtor attempted to claim that his
pension benefits were exempt under section 522(d)(10)(E) of the Bankruptcy
Code as reasonably necessary for his support. The Seventh Circuit denied the
debtor's claimed exemption. The denial was based upon the debtor's age as
well as his future earning capacity and ability to reestablish a retirement fund.
In attempting to define the reasonably necessary standard, the court stated that
"the appropriate amount to be set aside for the debtor ought to be sufficient
his former status in society or the
to sustain basic needs, not related 2to
19
lifestyle to which he is accustomed.,
In a Missouri case with facts less egregious than those in Kochell, the
debtor had interests in three retirement plans maintained by her employer. 2
The first plan, a pension plan, would pay the debtor approximately $587 per
month upon retirement. The trustee apparently conceded that creditors could
not reach the debtor's interest in this pension plan. The second plan was an
employee stock ownership plan ("ESOP"), in which the debtor's vested
interest was approximately $40,000. Finally, the debtor's interest in her
profit-sharing plan was approximately $25,000 at the time the bankruptcy
petition was filed. 22' The court held that the debtor's interests in the profitsharing and ESOP plans were not reasonably necessary for her support for
several reasons. First, the debtor would be able to save for her retirement in
the future. She had disposable income of $791 per month, was fifty-three
years old, in good health, and had a steady job. Thus, the court concluded
that she could apply a portion of her disposable income to saving for
retirement for approximately twelve years. Second, because the trustee
conceded that the debtor's pension plan assets were beyond the reach of her
creditors, she was assured of $587 per month upon retirement. Additionally,
the debtor's husband had22a retirement plan, which could also be used for her
support upon retirement. 2
The Third Circuit has adopted a unique interpretation of section
522(d)(10)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code. Contrary to the decisions discussed

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 566 (quoting In re Taff, 10 Bankr. 101, 107 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981)).
In re Davis, 125 Bankr. 242 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991).
Id. at 243-44.
Id. at 247.
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above, the Third Circuit has consistently held that section 522(d)(10)(E)
applies only in situations in which the debtor is currently receiving payments
from the pension or profit-sharing plan at issue.m In the leading case
espousing this view, In re Clark, the Third Circuit noted that the purpose
behind the Bankruptcy Code's exemption provisions was to provide honest
debtors with a fresh start after bankruptcy. The court reasoned that "[t]he
exemption of present Keogh payments, to the extent they are necessary for the
support of the debtor, is consistent with this goal. The exemption of future
payments, however, demonstrates a concern for the debtor's long-term security
which is absent from the statute." 4 Moreover, even in those cases in which
a debtor's benefits are currently in pay status, courts in the Third Circuit still
must determine whether those benefits are reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor and his dependents.22
The foregoing cases illustrate that deciding whether retirement benefits
are reasonably necessary for support is an .inherently factual determination.
Because no formal guidelines have been established for analyzing this issue,
debtors who reside in states that have not opted out of the federal exemption
system must make a difficult decision: should they elect the federal scheme
and gamble on whether their retirement benefits are reasonably necessary for
support, or should they elect the exemptions available under their state
exemption scheme as well as any other federal nonbankruptcy exemptions
available to them? As illustrated below, case law in this area makes a
debtor's decision particularly difficult.
C. Exempting Retirement Benefits Using
the FederalNonbankruptcy Exemptions
If a debtor in bankruptcy elects his state's exemption scheme rather than
the federal exemption scheme,226 the debtor can exempt assets out of his
bankruptcy estate using both the exemptions provided by his state as well as

223. Clark v. O'Neil (In re Clark), 711 F.2d 21, 23 (3d Cir. 1983). See also In

re Tisdale, 112 Bankr. 61, 66 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990); In re Velis, 109 Bankr. 64, 71
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) affid, 123 Bankr. 497 (D.N.J. 1991); In re Heisey, 88 Bankr.
47, 51 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988).
224. Clark, 711 F.2d at 23.
225. Tisdale, 112 Bankr. at 66.
226. The debtor would elect the state's scheme if either (i) the exemptions
provided in his state of residence are more generous than the federal exemptions, or
(i!) his state has elected out of the federal exemption scheme, and, therefore, he is only
entitled to use the state exemptions. For a list of the states that have opted out of the
federal exemption scheme, see supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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federal nonbankruptcy exemptions.2 7 One issue with which courts have
grappled in the pension area is whether ERISA's anti-alienation provisions
constitute a federal nonbankruptcy exemption available to debtors in
bankruptcy. If they do, then the debtor who elects his state's exemption
scheme can exempt his retirement benefits in full under ERISA, without

having to resort to the state's exemption provision governing retirement
benefits.
A majority of courts addressing this issue have held that ERISA does not
create a federal nonbankruptcy exemption under section 522(b)(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code.2u These courts have relied primarily upon the legislative
history of section 522 in reaching their decisions. Both the House and Senate
Reports contain a nonexclusive list of federal statutes that provide nonbankruptcy exemptions within the meaning of section 522(b)(2)(A). 2 9 ERISA
is not contained in that list.uo The cases espousing the majority view

227. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988). For the precise language of this statute,
see supra note 194.
228. See, e.g., Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d
1352, 1359-61 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); In re Lichstrahl,
750 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d
1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 583-86 (5th
Cir. 1983); In re Fullmer, 127 Bankr. 55, 58 (D. Utah 1991); In re Gaines, 121 Bankr.
1015, 1019 (W.D. Mo. 1990). For an extensive list of decisions holding that ERISA
does not create a federal nonbankruptcy exemption, see Koger & Goucher, supra note
85, at 16-17.
229. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6316; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5861.
230. The list includes:
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability payments, 22 U.S.C. 1104;
Social security payments, 42 U.S.C. 407;
Injury or death compensation payments from war risk hazards, 42 U.S.C.
1717;
Wages of fishermen, seamen and apprentices, 46 U.S.C. 601;
Civil service retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. 729, 2265;
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death and
disability benefits, 33 U.S.C. 916;
Railroad Retirement Act annuities and pensions, 45 U.S.C. 228(L);
Veterans benefits, 45 U.S.C. 352(E);
Special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor, 38
U.S.C. 3101; and
Federal homestead lands on debts contracted before issuance of the patent,
43 U.S.C. 175.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs 5963, 6316; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75, reprinted in
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acknowledge that the statutes enumerated in the legislative history are not
intended to be exhaustive. They reason, however, that because ERISA, a
significant piece of legislation enacted just four years earlier, was in existence
at the time of the Bankruptcy Code's enactment, coupled with the fact that
ERISA is referenced elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code,21 the exclusion of
ERISA from the list of statutes constituting federal nonbankruptcy law was
intentional. 2 Additionally, those courts holding that ERISA does not
constitute federal nonbankruptcy law have pointed to an important distinction
between those statutes listed in the legislative history of section 522 and
ERISA: ERISA governs private pension plans while the enumerated statutes
relate to public property interests, such as civil service retirement benefits and
veterans benefits.? 3 Based upon this distinction, a majority of courts have
concluded that it is reasonable to infer that Congress intentionally excluded
ERISA from the list of federal nonbankruptcy statutes. Therefore, the
majority view holds that ERISA-qualified retirement plans cannot be exempted

out of a debtor's bankruptcy estate under section 522(b)(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code.? 4

1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5861.
231. Section 522(d)(10)(E)(iii) refers to I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, and
409 (1988 & Supp. I 1989), which are the provisions that generally confer tax

advantages on various types of ERISA-qualified plans.
232. Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d at 1491 ("[t]he failure to mention ERISA in the
legislative history accompanying § 522(b)(2)(A) is, therefore, both purposeful and
reasoned"); Graham, 726 F.2d at 1274 (the Eighth Circuit found "the failure of

Congress to include ERISA plan benefits probative of Congressional intent that ERISA
was not a 'Federal Law' upon which a § 522(b)(2)(A) exemption could be based");
Goff, 706 F.2d at 585 (Congress' failure to mention ERISA when dealing with
§ 522(b) was intentional). See alsoDaniels, 771 F.2d at 1360-61; Gaines, 121 Bankr.
at 1019; In re Gribben, 84 Bankr. 494, 497 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Hendrick, Federal
Nonbankruptcy Law Includes ERISA, 1990 TEX. B.J. 854, 857 n.6.
233. In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985). The court in
Lichstrahlstated:

Despite the similarity between the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA and
some of the listed statutes, the "pensions, wages, benefits and payments
included in the ...

list are-all peculiarly federal in nature, created by

federal law or related to industries traditionally protected by the federal
government. In sharp contrast, ERISA regulates private employer pension
systems."
Id. (quoting Graham, 726 F.2d at 1274). See also Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706
F.2d 574, 586 (5th Cir. 1983); Gribben, 84 Bankr. at 497.

234. See supra note 233 for a list of cases comprising the majority view. Several
commentators concur in the majority view. See, e.g., Sterbach, Weiss, & Salerno, PreBankruptcy Planningfor Professionalsand ERISA QualifiedPensionPlans: Are State
CreatedStatutory Exemptions D.O.A. in Bankruptcy Proceedings?,94 CoM. L.J. 229,
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Despite the overwhelming authority to the contrary, a small number of
courts have held that ERISA's anti-alienation provisions do create a federal
nonbankruptcy exemption available to debtors who elect their state's
exemption scheme. 5 The most recent case to adopt this view, In re Suarez,
rejected the majority's argument that the legislative history of section 522 of
the Bankruptcy Code indicates a clear Congressional intent to exclude ERISA

from the ambit of federal nonbankruptcy law.z5 The Suarez court, relying
on the recent Supreme Court case of United States v. Ron PairEnterprises,

Inc.,237 determined that there was no need to resort to section 522's

legislative history because the statute itself was clear and unambiguous on its
. 8
face
Similarly, in In re Burns,2 9 an Oklahoma bankruptcy court, in a wellreasoned opinion, concluded that ERISA provided a federal nonbankruptcy
exemption for qualified pension plans within the meaning of section
522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. 240 The Burns court agreed with the
debtor's assertion that the absence of ERISA from the legislative history "does
not compel the conclusion that ERISA may not be includable within that
provision."'" The court offered several reasons for its conclusions. First,
two of the statutes cited in the legislative history as creating federal nonbankruptcy exemptions have since been repealed. u 2 Two other statutes listed in

242 (1989).
235. In re Suarez, 127 Bankr. 73, 79 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991); In re Majul, 119
Bankr. 118, 124 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Bums, 108 Bankr. 308, 313-15
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989); In re Komet, 104 Bankr. 799, 805-16 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1989); In re Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. 233, 236 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
236. Suarez, 127 Bankr. at 79.
237. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
238. Suarez, 127 Bankr. at 79. The court stated:
The task of resolving the dispute ...begins where all such inquiries
must begin: with the language of the statute itself. In this case it is also
where the inquiry should end, for where, as here, the statute's language is
plain, "the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its
terms." The language before us expresses Congress' intent . . . with

sufficient precision so that reference to legislative history and to pre-Code
practice is hardly necessary.
Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1988))
(citations omitted).
239. 108 Bankr. 308 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989).

240. Id. at 314-15.
241. Id.
242. The two statutes that were repealed were the civil service retirement benefit

statute, which was repealed in 1966, and the foreign service retirement and disability
statute, which was repealed in 1974. Id. at 315 n.7.
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the legislative history contained citations that were improper.243 Moreover,
the Burns court pointed out that the legislative history was not intended to
provide an all-inclusive list of statutes containing federal nonbankruptcy
exemptions. Both the House and Senate Reports state that "some of the items
clearly, indicating that the
that may be exempted . . . include . . .,
not
exhaustive.
Finally, the court
statutory list in the legislative history was
in Burns noted that the policy behind the enactment of ERISA was to protect
participants' interests in privately-funded pension plans. It stated that a
holding that ERISA's protections were ineffectual "simply because the
Congress failed to specify ERISA in a nonexclusive list of legislative
examples in the legislative history, would fly in the face of ERISA's principal
purpose. 245 Thus, the bankruptcy court in Burns concluded that ERISAqualified plans could be exempted out of a debtor's bankruptcy estate under
section6 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code as federal nonbankruptcy
24
law.
Clearly the most thorough and insightful decision espousing the minority
view is In re Komet,247 a case in which a Texas bankruptcy court directly
challenged the Fifth Circuit's decision in Goff v. Taylor (In re Gof).248 In

243. "The citation given for '[s]pecial pensions to winners of the Congressional
Medal of Honor' is to a statute dealing with veterans' benefits in general, including
winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor. The citation given for 'veterans
benefits' is to a statute dealing with railroad unemployment insurance." Id.
244. Id. at 315 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 360-61,
reprintedin NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW PRACTICE 354 (1988-89 ed.); S. REP. No. 95989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 75-76, reprinted in NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE 355 (1988-89 ed.) (emphasis added)).
245. Burns, 108 Bankr. at 315.
246. Id. The court in Burns hinted that Congress may want to impose a dollar
limitation on the ERISA nonbankruptcy exemption. It stated:
Section § 522(b)(2)(A) [sic] contains no monetary or other limitations. It

is not for this court, by judicial fiat, to establish any such limitations,
whether based upon this court's personal perception of fairness or equity or
otherwise. Should the Congress determine that some limitation upon the
available exemption is appropriate, or that ERISA plans should not be
includable under § 522(b)(2)(A), it is within its province, not that of this or
'any other court, to enact appropriate legislation in furtherance of such
determination.
Id. at 316.
247. 104 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
248. 706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983). The court in Komet described Goff's
decision, which stated that ERISA's anti-alienation provisions did not create a federal
nonbankruptcy exemption, as "strong dicta." Komet, 104 Bankr. at 805.
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rejecting the contention that ERISA's anti-alienation provisions create a
federal nonbankruptcy exemption, the Fifth Circuit in Goff stated:
ERISA's anti-assignment and alienation provisions are different in kind
from those contained in the statutes listed in the Code's legislative history
... ERISA merely provides that as a condition of obtaining qualified status
- with it attendant tax and other benefits - a pension plan must preclude
alienation or assignment of its benefits. It does not prohibit pension funds
from permitting alienation or assignments; rather, while it encourages and
favors qualified plans, it envisions that "disqualified" plans may be formed
which are still subject to ERISA's regulatory scheme but do not restrict
alienation or assignment. 24 9
The court in Komet disagreed with Goff in four respects. First, Komet
asserted that ERISA's anti-alienation provisions are required to be included in
any retirement plan, not just qualified plans eligible for tax-exempt status."
Second, contrary to the Fifth Circuit's contention in Goff that the legislative
history of the Bankruptcy Code evidenced a Congressional policy disfavoring
the retention of pension benefits, Komet persuasively argued that the intent of
Congress in enacting the exemption statutes was to permit debtors to exempt
their retirement benefits, either under the Bankruptcy Code's federal
exemption scheme or, alternatively, under ERISA as a federal nonbankruptcy
exemption."'
The court reasoned that debtors who elect their state's
election by being forced
exemption scheme should not be penalized for that
252
to forego the exemption of their pension benefits.

249. Goff, 706 F.2d at 583, 585.
250. Komet, 104 Bankr. at 809 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1988 & Supp. I
1989)). The Komet court stated:
More is at stake than mere loss of tax benefits, for ERISA is first of all a
labor statute which seeks to regulate nearly all private employee pension
benefit plans, whether they want to be regulated or not . . . . Goff is
incorrect, therefore, when it states that the anti-alienation language required
by ERISA § 206(d)(1) serves only a tax purpose. Certainly the tax
provisions are the "carrot" which induces voluntary compliance with
ERISA's labor regulations. The threat of loss of tax benefits is an effective
means to enforce the equitable requirements imposed by Part I of ERISA.
But it is just that-the means, not the end.
Komet, 104 Bankr. at 809 (emphasis in original).
251. Id. at 812-13.
252. The Komet court stated:
The overall structure of Section 522(b) manifests a congressional policy
which generally favors debtors retaining their retirement benefits. The
legislative history is effusive in according sufficient property to debtors for
their fresh start, with nary a hint of an intent to penalize debtors for
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Third, Komet rejected Goff's contention that the absence of ERISA from
the list of federal exemption statutes in section 522's legislative history
evidenced a congressional intent to exclude ERISA from federal nonbankruptcy law. The court in Komet stated: "Goff breaks a cardinal rule of
statutory construction when it relies so heavily on the listing in the legislative
history to support its conclusion that Congress did not intend to include
ERISA plans under the 'other federal law' rubric."253 Thus, Komet concluded that "[a]s Goff's interpretation derives from its heavy reliance on the
illustrative list in the legislative history, its logic must be rejected in the face
24
of the statute, which is clear and unambiguous on its face. , 5
Finally, Komet disagreed with the suggestion in Goff that ERISA's antialienation provisions were effectively overruled by the Bankruptcy Code.253
The Komet court found no conflict between ERISA's anti-alienation provisions
and the Bankruptcy Code. T6 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court in Komet
permitted the debtor to exempt all of his retirement benefits using ERISA's
federal nonbankruptcy exemption.
While the vast majority of courts have held that ERISA's anti-alienation
provisions do not create a federal nonbankruptcy exemption, it remains to be
seen whether cases like Burns and Komet will have an impact on future

decisions. Despite the thoughtful and persuasive analysis contained in these
cases, the minority view has yet to be adopted by any court of appeals.

choosing one exemption scheme over the other.
Id. at 813.
253. Id. at 814.
254. Id.

255. The court in Goff held that ERISA "clearly was not intended to affect the
operation of other federal law ....

Thus, ERISA's specific provision precluding

interference with the operation of federal law renders the Bankruptcy Code effective
over any ERISA provisions to the contrary ...." Goff, 706 F.2d at 587, 589.

256. Komet, 104 Bankr. at 816.
257. Id. Indeed, a number of commentators have recently rejected the reasoning
in Goff and its progeny and have concurred in the bankruptcy court's holding in
Komet, concluding that ERISA should be included as federal nonbankruptcy law under
§ 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Hendrick, supra note 232, at 856
("[t]he reasoning under Goff suffers from numerous weaknesses-most significantly,
the Goff court's reliance on incredible legislative history and misconstrued congressional silence."); Note, No More BananasIn the Oklahoma Split: Exempting ERISAQualified Pension Plans Under Section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 25
TULSA L.J.

799, 811 (1990) ("[a]lthough the majority viewpoint is from Circuit Courts
of Appeals, the reasoning used to reach the conclusion that a federal exemption does
not exist in ERISA is not well-supported and should not be followed by the Tenth
Circuit").
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Consequently, debtors attempting to exempt their retirement benefits in opt-out
states must rely primarily on their states' exemption schemes.
D. Exempting Retirement Benefits Under a State's Exemption

Scheme: Effect of ERISA 's Preemption of State Law
A debtor who forgoes the Bankruptcy Code's federal exemption scheme
is entitled to claim both (i) the federal nonbankruptcy exemptions outlined
The
above and (ii) the exemptions provided by her state of domicile25
debtor's domiciliary state is defined as "the place in which the debtor's
domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of
the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than
in any other place."5 9 Presumably this provision was incorporated into the
Bankruptcy Code to prevent a debtor from changing her state of residence just
before filing bankruptcy in order to take advantage of that state's more
generous exemption provisions.
Just as homestead exemption provisions vary widely from state to state,
the various states' exemption provisions pertaining to pension benefits
similarly vary dramatically. Some states, like Texas and New York, have
recently adopted legislation which allows a debtor to exempt the benefits from
all qualified pension and profit-sharing plans.20 Others, like California and

258. If a debtor elects the state exemption scheme, she can also exempt any
interest held as joint tenant or tenant by the entirety if that interest "is exempt from
process under applicable nonbankruptcy law." 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1988). An
entire body of law has developed to analyze this provision; however, the issue is
beyond the scope of this Article. See Note, "FreshStart" or "HeadStart": Missouri
CourtsRethink the Role of Tenancies by the Entirety in Bankruptcy, 56 Mo. L. REv.

817 (1991) for a discussion of recent case law analyzing § 522(b)(2)(B) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
259. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988).
260. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vernon Supp. 1988); N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. LAW § 5202(c)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1991). See also ARK. STAT. ANN.
§16-66-220 (Supp. 1989). It is interesting to note that Texas amended its exemption
provisions, effective September 1, 1987, following the Fifth Circuit's decision in Goff
v. Taylor, (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983), which had held that a debtor's
pension benefits were part of the bankruptcy estate. The Texas exemption statute also
encompasses governmental and church plans, which are beyond the scope of federal
protection under ERISA. See Gote, The Texas Exemption of Retirement Benefits:
Interactionwith the Bankruptcy Code and Possible Preemption by Mackey v. Lanier
Collections Agency & Service, 26 Hous. L. REv. 497 (1989). See also Hall,
Retirement Benefits: Texas Property Code Amendment, 1987 TEX. B.J. 993.
Similarly, prior to 1989, New York had no provision allowing an exemption for
retirement benefits. New York's current exemption provision was added in 1989.
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Missouri, follow the federal exemption provision and allow a debtor to exempt
only those benefits reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his
dependents." 1 Finally, some states have adopted other novel and creative
exemption provisions. Minnesota, for example, has taken a quite liberal

approach, allowing a debtor to exempt all retirement benefits from qualified
plans and, in addition, up to the present value of $42,000 in benefits from
non-qualified plans to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor's and her
dependents' support.?
The differences in state exemption provisions thus
can be quite dramatic and can influence a number of decisions facing a
bankrupt debtor. z3
Even though some states may offer a bankrupt debtor the opportunity to
exempt all, or at least a significant portion, of the debtor's retirement benefits
out of his bankruptcy estate, the debtor may nevertheless be prohibited from
taking advantage of such exemption provisions because of ERISA's preemption of state law. Congress enacted ERISA in an attempt to provide a uniform
set of provisions regulating and protecting pension and welfare plans. 2 " In

Illinois' exemption statute varies slightly in that it allows an exemption of retirement
assets from plans "intended in good faith" to be qualified plans. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, para. 12-1006 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991). Like many other states, Illinois
amended its exemption provision to provide for a more liberal exemption of retirement
benefits in 1989, effective for all proceedings filed after August 30, 1989, presumably
in response to the massive amount of litigation over the issue. See P.A. 86-1329 § 1
(1989).
261. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 703.140 (West 1987); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 513.430(10)(e) (1986).
262. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37, Subdiv. 24 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). When
this provision was originally added to the Minnesota exemption statute, the cap on
amounts from non-qualified plans was $30,000; however, that amount was increased
for inflation in 1990.
263. For example, a debtor who cannot protect her home from the reach of
creditors because a state's homestead exemption is quite limited may chose not to file
for bankruptcy relief at all, or may jhoose to file under Chapter 13 of the Code rather
than Chapter 7. Moreover, it is not unheard of for debtors to change their state of
residence prior to filing a bankruptcy petition in order to take advantage of more
generous exemption provisions in another state. In a tongue-in-cheek introduction to
his article, for example, one commentator recently suggested that in order to protect
ERISA plan benefits from the reach of creditors in bankruptcy, an Arkansas debtor

should move to Kansas before filing bankruptcy. See Westbrook, Retirement Plan
Assets in an Arkansas Bankruptcy, 43 ARK. L. REV. 253, 253 (1990). See also
Jackson, supra note 191, at 1437 n.141. Of course, as discussed above, the debtor
must reside in the new state long enough so that it qualifies as his state of domicile
for bankruptcy purposes. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
264. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). See also supra notes 1-4 and
accompanying text.
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order to accomplish this objective, ERISA contains a provision which
preempts state and local laws, thereby preventing them from infringing upon
ERISA's protections. 2" ERISA preempts "any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by
ERISA. 26 According to the Supreme Court in Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency & Service, Inc.,267 a state law "relates to" an ERISA plan "if it has
Following Mackey,
a connection with or reference to such a plan."'
bankruptcy and district courts have been divided over the issue of whether
ERISA preempts states' exemption provisions dealing with retirement plans
in a bankruptcy context.2 9
In Mackey, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether a
Georgia statute that prohibited the garnishment of a participant's interest in an
ERISA welfare benefit plan (as opposed to a pension benefit plan) was
preempted by ERISA. While ERISA requires that all pension benefit plans
contain anti-alienation provisions, welfare benefit plans need not contain such
provisions to be qualified under ERISA. 270 Based upon this distinction, the
Georgia Supreme Court had concluded that the Georgia statute "prohibits that
which the federal statute permits," 271 and, therefore, was preempted by
ERISA. The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the Georgia law "related
to" ERISA within the meaning of ERISA's preemption provision. 272 The
Court found irrelevant the possibility that Georgia enacted the statute to help
effectuate ERISA's underlying goals. According to the Court, ERISA's
preemption provision displaces "all state laws that fall within its sphere, even

265. As Representative John H. Dent stated in the legislative history to ERISA,
"the crowning achievement of [ERISA is] the reservation to Federal authority [of] the
sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans. With the preemption of the
field, we round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of
conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation." 120 CONG. REC. H29,197
(1974).
266. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988 & Supp. 11989) (emphasis added).
267. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
268. Id. at 829 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983))

(emphasis in original).
269. To date, it appears that no court of appeals has addressed the preemption

issue in a bankruptcy context following the Supreme Court's decision in Mackey.
Mackey did not involve a bankruptcy scenario.
270. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.

271. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 828 (quoting Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc.
v. Mackey, 256 Ga. 499, 501, 350 S.E.2d 439, 441-42 (1986)).
272. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829.
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including state laws that are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements."273
Based upon the Supreme Court's holding in Mackey, a majority of courts
that have addressed the issue of whether a debtor can exempt retirement

benefits in bankruptcy under his domiciliary state's exemption provisions have
held such provisions to be preempted by ERISA; they have thus disallowed
the debtor's exemption request.z7 These courts have consistently held that
even state law which is consistent with ERISA and furthers its intended
purposes is preempted.27 5 Under the majority view, it is irrelevant whether
the state exemption statute at issue actually refers to ERISA; any statute that
indirectly involves ERISA plans is preempted. 6 Finally, courts espousing
the majority view have consistently rejected the argument that because state
exemption schemes are expressly permitted in bankruptcy by virtue of
Bankruptcy Code section 522(b), that such exemption schemes become the
functional equivalent of federal legislation, which cannot be preempted by ERISA.n

273. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739
(1985)).
274. In re Fullmer, 127 Bankr. 55, 59 (D. Utah 1991); In re Gaines, 121 Bankr.
1015, 1021-23 (W.D. Mo. 1990); In re Wimmer, 121 Bankr. 539, 543 (Bankr. C.D.
Ill. 1990), affid, No. 91-1021 (C.D. Ill. July 19,' 1991) (WESTLAW, FBKR-CS
database); In re Martin, 115 Bankr. 311, 322 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990); In re Conroy,
110 Bankr. 492, 496 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990); In re Bums, 108 Bankr. 308, 311
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989); In re Flindall, 105 Bankr. 32, 37-38 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1989); In re Komet, 104 Bankr. 799, 801-02 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); In re McLeod,
102 Bankr. 60, 63 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989); In re Dyke, 99 Bankr. 343, 351-52
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989). For other cases holding that state law exemption provisions
are preempted by ERISA, see Koger & Goucher, supra note 85, at 17-18.
275. See, e.g., Fullmer, 127 Bankr. at 59, wherein the court stated that "[t]he
language of § 1144(a) [ERISA's preemption provision] is broad, and does not restrict
ERISA's preemptive effect to only those state laws with which it conflicts. Even state
law that furthers ERISA's purposes is preempted because § 1144(a) 'displaces all state
laws that fall within its sphere, eVen including state laws that are consistent with
ERISA's substantive requirements."' Id. (quoting Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829). See also
Komet, 104 Bankr. at 802.
276. See, e.g., Gaines,121 Bankr. at 1022-23; Komet, 104 Bankr. at 801 n.3. In
Gaines, for example, the court pointed out that "even indirect state action bearing on
private pensions may encroach upon the area of exclusive federal concern." Gaines,
121 Bankr. at 1022 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525
(1981)).
277. See Gaines,121 Bankr. at 1023; Martin, 115 Bankr. at 322; In re Felts, 114

Bankr. 131, 133 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Weeks, 106 Bankr. 257, 263 (Bankr.
E.D. Okla. 1989). See also In re Siegel, 105 Bankr. 556, 561-62 (D. Ariz. 1989).
This argument has often been referred to as the "federalization" of state law by courts
addressing the preemption issue.
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Despite the overwhelming body of authority to the contrary, a small
number of courts have interpreted Mackey narrowly to hold that only state
exemption statutes that conflict with ERISA's stated purposes are preempted
by ERISA. 2 8 In In re Vickers,279 a Missouri bankruptcy court was faced
with the issue of whether the Missouri statute exempting ERISA plans to the
extent reasbnably necessary for support, which parallels the Bankruptcy
Code's federal exemption provision, was preempted by ERISA.180 The
bankruptcy court found that the Missouri exemption provision was not
preempted by -ERISA because it was consistent with both ERISA and the
Bankruptcy Code. The court reasoned:
Congress specifically provided that ERISA would not be construed to
conflict with any law of the United States .... ERISA reads as follows:
•.. "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify,
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States ...... Thus,
Congress did not intend ERISA to conflict with any other Federal law. The
Bankruptcy Code is such a law .... [T]he Code would allow the debtor
to exempt his pension benefits to the extent reasonably necessary for
support. The Code also allows states to opt-out and create their own
bankruptcy exemptions. Surely Congress did not intend to prohibit states
from enacting exemption laws similar or identical to those contained in the
Bankruptcy Code itself. In any event, Congress determined that the Code
is paramount to ERISA. The same is true for state laws enacted pursuant
to specific authority of the Bankruptcy Code . . . Since the Code
specifically allowed the states to create exemptions, and since ERISA does
not prohibit or even speak to such exemptions, the only way to harmonize
[ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code] is to allow the exemption.2 1
Vickers was decided before the District Court for the Western District of
Missouri's decision in In re Gaines, which rejected the "federalization" of

state exemption law argument and held that Missouri's exemption provision

278. It appears that bankruptcy courts in three jurisdictions have adopted the
minority view. See In re Volpe, 100 Bankr. 840 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); but see
Felts, 114 Bankr. at 13 and Komet, 104 Bankr. at 799; In re Vickers, 116 Bankr. 149
(Bankr. W.D. Mo.), aff'd, 126 Bankr. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1990); but see In re Gaines,
121 Bankr. 1015 (W.D. Mo. 1990); In re Suarez, 127 Bankr. 73 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1991); In re Wines, 113 Bankr. 787 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Martinez, 107
Bankr. 378 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989); In re Bryan, 106 Bankr. 749 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.

1989).
279. 116 Bankr. 149 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.), affd, 126 Bankr. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
280. Id. at 150.
281. Id. at 154.
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was preempted by ERISA. z The Vickers2 3decision, however, was also later
upheld on appeal by the Western District. 8
The Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of Florida recently
reaffirmed the minority view in In re Suarez.2 In Suarez, the court refused
to apply the preemption doctrine because the Florida exemption statute at
issue was consistent with the policies of ERISA. The court stated that "unlike
the State law involved in Mackey which sought to impose a different result
than ERISA, [the Florida exemption statute] is consistent with ERISA's5
purpose of protecting pension money from attachment of creditors."28
Accordingly, the court found no need for preemption because the Florida
exemption statute complemented ERISA's stated purpose, resulting in no
conflict between state and federal law.
The other jurisdiction espousing the minority view is the Western District
of Texas, where there is a split among the bankruptcy judges on the
preemption issue.6 The leading minority case on the preemption issue is
In re Volpe.287 The court in Volpe offered four arguments in support of its
conclusion that ERISA did not preempt Texas' exemption provision governing
ERISA retirement plans. First, Volpe contended that only state statutes that
conflicted with ERISA were preempted.m Second, the Volpe court bolstered its decision by arguing that the Supreme Court in Mackey intended only
for ERISA to preempt state laws that have reference to ERISA, not statutes
that make reference to ERISA.m9 Because the Texas statute merely referred
to ERISA, its connection with ERISA was too tenuous to evoke preemp-

282. Gaines, 121 Bankr. at 1021-23.

283. In re Vickers, 116 Bankr. 149 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.), aff'd, 126 Bankr. 348
(W.D. Mo. 1990). It will be interesting to observe the reaction of the bankruptcy court
in the Western District of Missouri to the Gaines and Vickers dichotomy. Both
Vickers and Gainesare currently on appeal to the Eighth Circuit. Following the Eighth
Circuit's decision, there may be only two remaining jurisdictions that uphold the
minority view on the preemption issue.
284. 127 Bankr. 73, 78 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991).
285. Id.
286. See supra note 278. See also Note, ERISA Preemption of State Exemption
Laws: The Effects in Bankruptcy, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 615 (1990) [hereinafter Note,
ERISA Preemption]; Gote, supra note.260, at 527.

287. 100 Bankr. 840 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
288. Id. at 847-48. The court stated that "[n]o state law is preempted unless it
conflicts with valid federal law." Id. The court also relied on the statement by
Representative Dent in the legislative history to the Bankruptcy Code that only state
statutes conflicting with ERISA were affected by its preemption provisions. See supra
note 265 and accompanying text.
289. Volpe, 100 Bankr. at 848.
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tion. 2 Third, Volpe argued that the Texas exemption statute did not relate
to ERISA because it did not regulate ERISA plans or their participants.2 '
Finally, Volpe supported its decision by holding that ERISA did not preempt
the Texas statute because the statute was one of general application, which
only peripherally related to ERISA.m
Although several bankruptcy courts have made valiant attempts to uphold
their states' exemption provisions in bankruptcy, the great weight of authority
has nevertheless invalidated such exemption statutes under ERISA's
preemption provisions. Thus, in states that have opted out of the Bankruptcy

appears to be no protection for
Cod's federal exemption scheme, there
293
debtor's ERISA benefits in bankruptcy.

V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION AIMED AT HARMONIZING
ERISA AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
It is difficult to believe that it has been thirteen years since the enactment
of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, and yet such fundamental issues as whether
pension benefits are included in a debtor's bankruptcy estate still remain
unanswered. The circuit courts of appeals are clearly divided on the issue,
and the Supreme Court has thus far chosen not to resolve the resulting dispute.
Regardless of the outcome of this issue, however, a conflict exists between
ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code that must be resolved. In order to
harmonize these two federal statutes, a number of difficult issues must be
addressed. First, does ERISA constitute "applicable nonbankruptcy law" so
that section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code excludes a debtor's pension
benefits from his bankruptcy estate? If so, is this the proper result? Does it
best promote the policies of both ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code? As
discussed below, a thorough analysis of the Bankruptcy Code and relevant
case law leads inexorably to the conclusion that In re Moore and its progeny
have correctly interpreted the language of section 541(c)(2) to conclude that
ERISA benefits are excluded from a debtor's bankruptcy estate. Unfortunate-

290. Several commentators have strongly criticized Volpe for this distinction. See
Sterbach, Weiss, & Salerno, supra note 234, at 248-49; Note, ERISA Preemption,
supra note 286, at 634.
291. Volpe, 100 Bankr. at 854.
292. Id. For an excellent discussion of the Volpe decision, as well as the contrary
authority decided by the Western District of Texas bankruptcy courts, see Note, ERISA
Preemption, supra note 286, at 632-39.
293. See Dunn & Knasinski, Bankruptcy Debtors: ERISA 's Impact on Pension
and Retirement Benefits, 63 Wis. LAW. 20, 22 (1990); Checkett, MissouriBankruptcy
Exemption of Pension Benefits, 46 J. Mo. B. 267, 269 (1990). See also Sterbach,

Weiss, & Salerno, supra note 234, at 250-51.
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ly, as is the. case here, proper statutory construction does not always lead to
equitable policy results.

A. In re Moore Correctly InterpretsBankruptcy Code Section 541(c)(2)
The Fourth Circuit in Moore concluded that the phrase "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" in section 541(c)(2) referred to both state and federal law,
thus bringing ERISA within the meaning of the phrase. Consequently,
Moore's interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code resulted in the exclusion of
ERISA-qualified retirement plans from a debtor's bankruptcy estate. This
minority view is better reasoned than the view espoused in Graham and its
progeny. It is also in accordance with fundamental principles of statutory
construction.
For example, as Moore pointed out, clearly Congress knew how to
distinguish between state law, federal law, and "applicable nonbankruptcy
law." The phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" has consistently been held
to include both state and federal law.29 The Bankruptcy Code is replete
with references to each of these three terms; in fact, section 522(b) contains
separate references to federal law, state law, and "applicable nonbankruptcy
As the court in Moore stated, it is a basic axiom of'statutory
law."295

294. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
295. Section 522(b) establishes the dual federal and state exemptions schemes.
It provides in pertinent part that the following property is exempt from the reach of
creditors:
(1) Property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the
State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this
subsection specifically does not so authorize; or in the alternative,
(2)(a) any property that is exempt under Federallaw, other than subsection
(d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the
filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor's domicile has been
located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the
petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other
place; and
(b) any interest in property which the debtor had, immediately before the
commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint
tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint
tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
There are numerous other references to "state law" in the Bankruptcy Code,
including 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(12) (1988); 11 U.S.C.
§ 903(1) (1988); Bankruptcy Rule 3001(g). Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code contains
numerous references to "applicable nonbankruptcy law" as well, including: 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(56) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 108(a)-(c) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 363(0(1) (1988); 11
U.S.C. §§ 365(c)(3), (h)(1), (n)(1)(A)-(B) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (1988); 11
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construction that identical phrases contained in the same statute must be given
the same meaning. 6 Accordingly, the reference to "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code must include both
state and federal law. ERISA is such a federal law, and its anti-alienation

provisions prevent creditors from reaching a debtor's qualified plan benefits.
Moreover, ERISA is not a bankruptcy law.

Consequently, it satisfies the

literal requirements of section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 2'
There are two potential problems with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation
of section 541(c)(2). First, the legislative history suggests a much narrower
interpretation of that section than the Moore court has accepted. Although
legislative history can be an important tool in ascertaining congressional
intent, it is well-settled that resorting to legislative history is both unnecessary
and unwarranted where the language of the statute itself is clear and
unambiguous on its face. 298 The only instance in which a review of
legislative history is appropriate is in those "rare cases [in which] the literal
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of its drafters." 299 This is not stich a case. There is nothing
inherently ambiguous about the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law,"
especially in light of the fact that there are numerous references to the term
throughout the Bankruptcy Code, and, in addition, the phrase "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" is clearly distinguished from the phrase "state law"
therein.
Moreover, as Moore suggested, even if one were to resort to legislative
The legislative history of section
history, it is inconclusive at best.3
541(c)(2) merely suggests that state spendthrift trust law was an example of
the type of restrictions enforceable under "applicable nonbankruptcy law" that
would be enforceable in bankruptcy. There is absolutely no suggestion in the
legislative history that section 541(c)(2) was intended to encompass only state
spendthrift trust law. As two commentators recently suggested, the absence

U.S.C. § 524(c) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 927 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(6) (1988); 11
U.S.C. § 1123(a) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b)(1) (1988);
11 U.S.C. § 1142(a) (1988).

296. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. See also Bamson v. United
States, 816 F.2d 549, 554 (10th Cir. 1987).
297. Two commentators have recently urged the adoption of this analysis, which
they refer to as the "plain meaning" approach. See Brankey & Darr, supra note 40,
at 299.
298. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982); Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
299. Ron PairEnters., 489 U.S. at 242 (quoting Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571).
300. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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of any reference to ERISA in the legislative history probably means merely
that Congress did not consider the specific situation involved herein when it
adopted the Bankruptcy Code.301 Additionally, resort to the legislative
history of section 541(c)(2) is unfounded because it is internally inconsistent.

Compare, for example, two references to section 541(c)(2) in the House
Report. The first reference states that the section excludes a "debtor's interest
in a spendthrift trust to the extent the trust is protected from creditors under
applicable State law."03 2 Elsewhere in the legislative history, the House
Report states that section 541(c)(2) "preserves restrictions on transfer of a
spendthrift trust to the extent that the restriction is enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law."30 3 While both excerpts refer to spendthrift
trusts, one relies on state law while the other refers to "applicable nonbankruptcy law." These inconsistencies hardly form the basis upon which to
conclude that Congress clearly intended the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" to encompass only state spendthrift trust law, even though the use of the
phrase elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code includes both state and federal law.
The second potential problem with the Moore approach is the possible
conflict between section 541(c)(2) and section 522(d)(10)(E), the Bankruptcy
Code's exemption provision governing pension benefits. Recall that, under
that provision, pension benefits can be exempted out of the bankruptcy estate
to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of a debtor and his
dependents, unless the plan at issue (i) was created by an insider of the debtor,
(ii) was on account of age or length of service, and (iii) was not a qualified
plan.3 4 Based upon this statutory provision, some courts have reasoned that
Congress must have intended to include qualified pension benefits in a
debtor's bankruptcy estate; otherwise, a provision exempting such benefits out
of the estate would have been unnecessary.0 5
Although these provisions might have been more artfully drafted, there
is no inherent inconsistency between sections 541(c)(2) and 522(d)(10)(E).
Individual retirement accounts ("IRA's") and certain church plans are not
required to contain anti-alienation provisions in order to be qualified under
ERISA. Hence, there are some types of qualified plans that do not contain
transfer restrictions and are, therefore, included in a debtor's estate even under
a Moore analysis. 306 Consider, then, the following interpretation of these

301. See Brankey & Darr, supra note 40, at 300.
302. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 176, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6136 (emphasis added).
303. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 368, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
& ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6324 (emphasis added).
304. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)(i)-(iii) (1988).
305. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.

CONG.

306. See Seiden, supra note 201, at 318.
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sections: interests in ERISA-qualified retirement plans, except IRA's and
certain church plans, are excluded from the bankruptcy estate under section
541(c)(2); interests in non-qualified plans, IRA's, and such church plans are
included'in the estate but can be exempted out to the extent reasonably
necessary for support unless the plan at issue was established by an insider of
the debtor, such as his wholly-owned corporation or a corporation in which
the debtor 'is a director or officer.3" Such an interpretation of these
statutory provisions renders them entirely consistent and, additionally, leaves
a host of both qualified and unqualified retirement plans available for
exemption by the debtor. °8
B. Should Retirement Benefits be Excluded from the
Bankruptcy Estate?
Concluding that Moore and its progeny have correctly interpreted section
541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code is merely the first step in analyzing the
pension issue. It is next necessary to determine whether such a result best
promotes the policies of ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code, or, alternatively,
whether a different result could better harmonize the two federal statutes.
While excluding retirement benefits, regardless of size, from a debtor's
bankruptcy estate certainly promotes the purpose of ERISA, it does so at the
expense of bankruptcy creditors. Allowing a debtor to retain over $945,000
39
in retirement benefits in bankruptcy, as the court permitted in In re Wyles, 0
hardly provides an equitable distribution to creditors, one of the fundamental
policy objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.
Particularly troublesome is the
case of the self-settled pension plan and trust, where the debtor has established
the retirement plan and retains complete dominion and control over the plan.
If plan assets are excluded from a debtor's estate in such a case, creditors are
denied access to plan benefits, even though the debtor can gain access to them
at will, subject only to possible adverse tax consequences.3
Inthe case of
a self-settled plan, it is difficult to elevate ERISA's policy of protecting an

307. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A)(iv) (1988).
308. One may argue that the provision in §522(d)(10)(E) disallowing certain nonqualified plans from exemption implies that qualified plans are available for exemption.
However, an equally plausible interpretation is that the provision implies that qualified
plans are already excluded from the bankruptcy estate under § 541(c)(2); therefore, it
would only be necessary to exempt non-qualified plan interests from the bankruptcy
estate.
309. 123 Bankr. 733 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991).

310. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., Wyles, 123 Bankr. at 733.

See also supra notes 73-77 and

accompanying text.
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employee's anticipated pension benefits from his employer's improvidence or
misconduct over the Bankruptcy Code's policy of maximizing creditors'
payments, because the employee and employer are generally one and the
same.
The final problem with the minority approach espoused in Moore is that
it encourages debtors contemplating bankruptcy to sell property which would
otherwise be nonexempt and invest the proceeds in qualified retirement plans,
thus placing the assets beyond the reach of creditors. The legislative history
of the Bankruptcy Code seems to suggest that the drafters condoned this
process, which is often referred to as pre-filing conversion. It states: "[a]s
under current law, the debtor will be permitted to convert non-exempt property
into exempt property before filing a bankruptcy petition. The practice is not
fraudulent as to creditors, and permits the debtor to make full use of the
exemptions to which he is entitled under the law. 3' 12 Despite this legislative
history, a number of courts have held such pre-filing conversion to be a fraud
on creditors, and have denied the debtor a discharge from his debts upon the
conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding. 313 If a debtor is permitted to
liquidate nonexempt assets and invest them in a qualified retirement plan
before bankruptcy, the policy of protecting creditor's rights is further
frustrated. Surely this was not the type of retirement saving that Congress
wished to foster in enacting ERISA 14
All of the criticisms that can be waged against excluding retirement
benefits from a debtor's bankruptcy estate appear to center around the concept
of fairness to creditors. It somehow seems fundamentally unfair to allow a
debtor to retain thousands of dollars in retirement benefits while being
discharged from debts that the debtor legitimately owes to creditors.
Would the policies of ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code be better served
if all ERISA plan benefits were included in the bankruptcy estate? Unfortunately, such a solution is also fraught with difficulties. The most serious
problem with this approach is that including plan benefits in a bankruptcy
estate would violate ERISA's anti-alienation provisions, thereby potentially

312. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 76, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5862.

313. See, e.g., In re Tveten, 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988). See also Koger &
Reynolds, Is Prefiling Engineering Prudent Planning or Section 727 Fraud? (Or,
When Does a Pig Become a Hog?), 93 CoM. L.J. 465 (1988).

314. Consider, for example, the case of a Florida psychologist who injured a
small child in an automobile accident. A lawsuit seeking $6.5 million in damages was
filed against the psychologist as a result of the accident. Subsequent to the filing of
the lawsuit, the doctor converted nonexempt assets into exempt pensions and other
annuities and then filed for bankruptcy relief. The court upheld the transfers,
determining that they were not a fraud on creditors. See In re Kimmel, No. 90-24577
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 13, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Bankr. file).
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disqualifying the plan and forcing it to lose its tax-deferred status. Because
the favorable tax consequences associated with an ERISA-qualified plan are
contingent upon the plan containing anti-alienation provisions, a court order
requiring turnover of plan assets to a bankruptcy trustee at least arguably
violates ERISA's prohibition against alienation of plan benefits. The Internal
Revenue Service has taken the position that such a forced turnover of plan
benefits would disqualify the entire pension plan.315 Devastating tax consequences could result if the Internal Revenue Service is successful in causing

such plans to lose their tax-advantaged status. For example, the employer
who -established the plan would no longer be able to deduct contributions

made to the plan. Moreover, interest earned on the plan's assets would be
taxable currently. Finally, employees would be unable to defer taxes owed on
employer contributions made on the employees' behalf, even if the employees
do not currently receive the benefits.
The position taken by the Service has put plan trustees in a very
precarious position. If the trustees comply with the court order requiring
turnover of plan assets, and the plan is thereby disqualified, they may be
breaching their fiduciary obligations with respect to beneficiaries of the
plan. 316 Hallmark Cards, Inc., for example, has recently appealed a
bankruptcy court decision requiring an employee's interest in three retirement
plans established by the company to be turned over to the bankruptcy trustee
for distribution to the employee's creditors. Hallmark is appealing the ruling
both to protect the employee's future retirement savings and to protect itself
from being exposed to millions of dollars in retroactive tax liabilities.317 A
number of other large corporations are also contesting bankruptcy court orders
requiring turnover of plan assets, and this litigation is seriously depleting plan
assets.318

315. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8951067 (Sept. 28, 1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8910035 (Mar. 10,
1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8131020 (May 5, 1981). Although these private letter rulings
have no precedential value with respect to any party other than the taxpayer requesting
the ruling, they nevertheless evidence the Service's position with respect to the
disqualification issue. The Internal Revenue Service has also espoused this position
in at least one bankruptcy court case. See In re Witte, 92 Bankr. 218, 223 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1988).
316. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-14 (1988 & Supp. I 1989). For an excellent
discussion of the potential adverse ramifications facing a plan administrator if forced
to turn over plan assets to a bankruptcy trustee, see Seiden, supra note 201, at 334-45.
317. The Kansas City Star, May 28, 1991, at D3, col 2. The article states that
according to court documents, Hallmark's retirement fund contained $317 million in
1989 and its profit-sharing plan contained $1.08 billion in assets at the end of that
year. Id.
318. Wal-Mart is one such corporation contesting a turnover order. Id.
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Although some courts that have included a debtor's retirement benefits
in his bankruptcy estate have grappled with the plan disqualification issue,
none have reached a satisfactory resolution to the problem. Some courts have
simply rejected the plan disqualification argument without providing any
reasoning for their decisions.1 Other courts, for example, have ruled that,
because the Bankruptcy Code was enacted after ERISA, it created an implicit
exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provisions. 32' As two commentators
have persuasively argued, however, the contention that the Bankruptcy Code
created an implied exception to ERISA is weakened by the fact that Congress
created an express exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provisions in 1984
when it enacted the qualified domestic relations order provisions, and yet
failed to create such an exception for bankruptcy orders at that time. 321 The
argument is further underjmined by the Supreme Court's recent decisioi in
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund, wherein the Court
refused to recognize an implied exception to 322ERISA's anti-alienation
provisions for an employee's criminal misconduct.
. A second problem with including a debtor's retirement
benefits in his
bankruptcy estate is that it conflicts with ERISA's stated purpose of insuring
that employees' benefits be available for retirement. The resulting problem
is twofold. First, the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code are promoted at the
expense of those of ERISA; second, the government may incur significant
financial burdens if forced to support debtors who have no pension benefits
accumulated upon retirement.
Finally, the inclusion of pension benefits in a debtor's bankruptcy estate
-may prove to be an administrative nightmare. A bankruptcy trustee steps into
the shoes of the debtor and takes property subject to the same restrictions that
were imposed on the debtor before bankruptcy. Therefore, the trustee may be
unable to compel an immediate distribution of assets from the debtor's ERISA

319. See, e.g., In re Gribben, 84 Bankr. 494, 498 (S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Threet,
118 Bankr. 805, 809 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990); In re Gallagher, 101 Bankr. 594, 604
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
320. In re DiPiazza, 29 Bankr. 916, 923 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1983). The bankruptcy
court in DiPiazza stated that an order requiring turnover of plan assets would not
disqualify a plan from receiving favorable tax benefits, despite the fact that a private
letter ruling was issued by the Internal Revenue Service which ruled otherwise. Id.
See also Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1982), wherein the court stated:
"We believe, however, that to the extent that Congress evidenced clear intent to
include pension benefits in the property of a Chapter 13 estate-a matter which we
believe is demonstrated above-it necessarily amended §401(a)(13) and applicable
Treasury regulations accordingly." Id.
321. See Brankey & Darr, supra note 40, at 297-98.
322. 110 S. Ct. 680 (1990).
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plan if the debtor had no present right to do so. 323 Many debtors have
successfully claimed that, because they have no access to their pension funds
in the absence of an event triggering distribution, such as death, retirement,
or termination of employment, the bankruptcy trustee cannot compel
immediate turnover of pension fund assets. 324 Under this line of cases, the
bankruptcy trustee has three options. First, he can choose to keep the
bankruptcy proceeding open until the debtor retires, dies, or terminates
employment.
Second, the bankruptcy trustee can sell the contingent right
to receive distributions in the future and use the funds for distribution to
creditors.3 6 Finally, the trustee can abandon the property because it has a
present value that is inconsequential to the estate. 27
The first alternative, keeping the bankruptcy estate open until a
contingency permitting distribution occurs, is administratively unfeasible.
Nearly all debtors filing for bankruptcy relief have interests in pension plans
that they are not currently able to reach. Requiring bankruptcy courts to keep
all of these proceedings open is simply unworkable, particularly in light of
their already overburdened dockets. The second alternative, permitting the
trustee to sell the contingent future income stream, may also prove administratively difficult because few investors would be willing to commit the time
necessary to make difficult calculations of the present value of a future income
stream for relatively small pension distributions. The final alternative,

323. See In re Schauer, 835 F.2d 1222, 1225 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Silldorff, 96
Bankr. 859, 866 (C.D. I1l. 1989). The bankruptcy trustee may, however, be entitled
to petition for a hardship withdrawal from the plan if the debtor possessed that right.
See id. at 867.
324. In re Groves, 120 Bankr. 956, 965-66 (Bankr. N.D. I1l. 1990); In re Bartlett,
116 Bankr. 1015, 1024 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990); In re Smith, 115 Bankr. 144, 147
(Bankr. C.D. III. 1990); In re Balay, 113 Bankr. 429, 445 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In
re Loe, 83 Bankr. 641, 646 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988); In re DeWeese, 47 Bankr. 251,

256 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985). See also Silldorff, 96 Bankr. at 868.
325. Groves, 120 Bankr. at 966. The court in Groves correctly points out,
however, that any post-petition contributions made by the debtor are not property of
the estate and must be returned to the debtor. Id. at 966 n.12. See also 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a) (1988). In one case, the debtor terminated his employment during the
pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding and the trustee was allowed to recover the prepetition portion of the debtor's pension benefits for the bankruptcy estate. In re
Ryerson, 739 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984).
326. Groves, 120 Bankr. at 966.
327. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988); Bartlett, 116 Bankr. at 1024 n.13,
wherein the court suggested that it would probably grant an order seeking abandonment of plan assets over creditors' objections.
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abandonment of the pension plan interest, certainly results in only a pyrrhic
victory for the bankruptcy trustee.3"
Although most cases hive held that the bankruptcy trustee succeeds only
to those rights that the debtor had at the time of the bankruptcy filing, a recent
line of cases has emerged that permits a trustee to compel immediate turnover
of plan assets to the bankruptcy estate. 329 In most of these cases, the debtor
has the ability to obtain the pension funds at any time simply by terminating
employment. The courts espousing this view thus reason that the trustee has
also gained the present right to require distribution of the funds, 330 even
though the trustee does not have
the right to compel the debtor to terminate
331
his employment relationship.
This recent line of cases compelling immediate turnover of plan assets
seems to violate the spirit of ERISA. A plan participant cannot generally
receive distributions, except in limited circumstances such as hardship, until
an event such as retirement or termination of employment occurs. Therefore,
the fact that the trustee is permitted to receive a distribution from the plan
prior to such a triggering event would appear to violate ERISA. Nevertheless,
it is becoming more commonplace for courts to require immediate turnover of
plan assets so as to avoid administrative difficulties in the future.

328. According to the bankruptcy court in Balay, 113 Bankr. at 443, a pyrrhic
victory is defined as "a victory gained at ruinous loss, such as that of Pyrrhus the
Greek over the Romans in B.C. 279." Id. The reason that the trustee's victory is a
hollow one is because he has likely incurred legal and other administrative expenses
in bringing the debtor's pension benefits into the bankruptcy estate, only to have them
abandoned later as of inconsequential value.
329. See, e.g., In re Green, 115 Bankr. 1001, 1010 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990), in
which the bankruptcy court justified its holding by stating the following:
If a trustee has to wait for funds to which he is entitled, and as to which the
debtor has no claim, there is no benefit to the debtor, but there is a harm
to the creditors who in turn are forced to wait for their share of such
proceeds. Requiring that the funds be turned over immediately enables the
bankruptcy case to be processed as expeditiously as possible.
See also In re Lyons, 114 Bankr. 572, 578 (Bankr. C.D. II1.1990), wherein the

court found that because the administrative impracticalities of keeping the case open
and monitoring it until the debtor reached retiiement age were excessive, it could
compel immediate turnover of pension plan assets under its broad powers granted by
§ 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.

330. See In re Tomer, 117 Bankr. 391, 397 (Bankr. S.D. I1. 1990); In re Schmitt,
113 Bankr. 1007, 1013-14 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990).
331. In re Carlin, No. 90-60723-S (Bankr. W.D. Mo. March 6, 1991)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
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C. HarmonizingERISA and the Bankruptcy Code:
A ProposedSolution

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that it is not enough simply to
conclude that retirement benefits either be included in or excluded from a
debtor's bankruptcy estate. Although both options possess certain advantages,
each creates numerous problems as well. Excluding pension benefits from a
bankruptcy estate promotes the objectives of ERISA at the expense of
creditors and encourages debtors to place nonexempt assets beyond the reach
of creditors by investing them in a retirement plan before bankruptcy.
Conversely, including benefits in the estate creates administrative burdens,
results in potential plan disqualification, and elevates the rights of creditors
under the Bankruptcy Code over the debtor's protections afforded under
ERISA. Because neither approach is entirely satisfactory, a solution that
attempts to harmonize the competing policies of ERISA and the Bankruptcy
Code is warranted.
It seems fundamentally unfair to deny creditors any access to a debtor's
retirement benefits, regardless of their size. Thus, the resolution of this
problem must begin by including a debtor's retirement benefits in his estate,
and then permitting exemption as necessary for the debtor's fresh start.
The proposed solution will consist of six elements: (1) repeal section
541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code so that all pension benefits come into the
bankruptcy estate;332 (2) permit exemption of pension benefits to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his dependents, but
provide specific guidelines for courts to determine what amounts are
reasonably necessary for support; (3) eliminate state pension exemption
schemes in bankruptcy so that a uniform exemption statute governing
retirement benefits is available to all debtors in bankruptcy; (4) allow debtors
to convert nonexempt assets into exempt assets, such as retirement benefits,
within the prescribed limitations of the federal exemption scheme; (5) amend
ERISA to provide an exception to its anti-alienation provisions for bankruptcy
orders similar to the exception currently in effect for qualified domestic
relations orders; and (6) further amend ERISA so that a bankruptcy trustee can
force immediate turnover of plan assets for the benefit of creditors rather than
wait until an event triggering distribution occurs. Each of these elements will
be discussed in detail below.

332. For a discussion of the treatment accorded spendthrift trusts under this
scenario, see infra p. 560.
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1. The Repeal of Bankruptcy Code Section 541(c)(2)
In order to ensure thaf all pension benefits are initially included in the
bankruptcy estate, section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code must be repealed.
In that way, even pension plans that constitute spendthrift trusts under
applicable state law will fall within the ambit of the bankruptcy estate. Of

course, one issue that arises with the repeal of section 541(c)(2) is the status
of the traditional spendthrift trust. A debtor's interest in a traditional
spendthrift trust established by another to protect against the debtor's folly or
improvidence would initially be included in the estate under this scenario.
Such a result, however, is not as novel as it may appear at first blush. The
Senate version of section 541(c)(2) proposed that transfer restrictions under,
for example, a traditional spendthrift trust, would be enforced only to the
33
extent necessary for the support of the debtor and his dependents.
Accordingly, were section 541(c)(2) to be repealed, a provision should be
added to the federal exemption scheme permitting a debtor to exempt
spendthrift trust assets out of the bankruptcy estate to the extent reasonably
necessary for support. Such a provision could be added to the end of section
522(d)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code and would state:
(11) the debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable to
(F) a payment under a trust containing a restriction on the transfer of a
beneficial interest of the debtor that is enforceable under state spendthrift
trust law, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor
and any dependent of the debtor.
A repeal of section 541(c)(2), coupled with this amendment to the federal
exemption provisions, would give the bankruptcy judge greater control over
the assets of the debtor. It would ensure the most equitable distribution to
creditors while protecting traditional spendthrift trust restrictions to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his dependents.
2. Guidelines for the Exemption of Pension Benefits
While including pension benefits in the bankruptcy estate furthers the
Bankruptcy Code policy of maximizing distribution to creditors, it thwarts
ERISA's policy of protecting employees' pension benefits. Balancing these

two competing policies requires that debtors be permitted to retain at least
some of their accumulated retirement benefits. Section 522(d)(10)(E) allows

333. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 83, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
NEws 5787, 5869. See also supra note 71.

CONG. & ADMIN.
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debtors to exempt such retirement benefits out of the estate "to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor.334 Although this exemption provision establishes a good starting
point, it does not offer a complete solution because there are no guidelines to
assist bankruptcy courts in determining what is reasonably necessary for
support. Most courts addressing the issue have either permitted none of a
debtor's benefits to be exempted out of the estate, reasoning that the debtor
had the ability to rebuild a pension before retirement, or, alternatively, have
permitted the exemption of all retirement benefits as reasonably necessary for
support. Uniformity is needed in this area so that debtors can make informed
decisions concerning whether (i) to file for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7
or Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, or (ii) to file for bankruptcy relief at
all. Knowing with certainty the amount of pension benefits that they will be
able to retain in bankruptcy will assist debtors with both of these decisions.
Additionally, uniform treatment of all retirement benefits in bankruptcy,
regardless of the type of plan involved, will be advantageous because courts
will not be forced to afford different treatment to various types of benefits
depending on the particularities of the retirement plan at issue.
The guidelines would allow every debtor to retain a percentage of his
retirement benefits that have accumulated at the time the bankruptcy petition
is filed. The applicable percentage is determined according to a sliding scale
based upon the debtor's age at the time of filing. The scale assumes that a
younger debtor has a greater ability to rebuild a pension before retirement than
an older debtor. The percentage calculation will differ depending upon
whether the debtor's retirement benefits are in a defined benefit plan, such as
a pension plan, or a defined contribution plan, such as a profit-sharing plan.
Additionally, the guidelines will impose a ceiling on the maximum amount of
retirement benefits that a debtor will be permitted to retain.
In a defined benefit plan, a participant does not have a separate
"account," but rather is guaranteed a specified monthly payment during his
lifetime, usually beginning upon retirement at age sixty-five. Conversely, in
a defined contribution plan the participant has a separate account containing
her retirement benefits; they are generally distributed in a lump sum to the
participant upon retirement. Under the proposed guidelines, a debtor holding
an interest in a defined benefit plan would be permitted to retain a percentage
of projected monthly payments based upon current pension benefits; the debtor
with a defined contribution plan interest would be permitted to retain a
percentage of the account balance at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed.
The following percentages would be applicable in either case:

334. See supra notes 304-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
limited exception to this exemption privilege.
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Age
25
30
35
40
45

Retained Percentage
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%

50

60%

55
60
65
70

70%
80%
90%
100%

Thus, for example, a forty-year-old lawyer filing for bankruptcy relief
who would be entitled to a monthly payment of $500 based upon current
investments in his pension plan would be allowed to retain 40% of those
projected benefits, or $200 per month. Similarly, a fifty-five-year-old
electrician having a $30,000 interest in his company's profit-sharing plan
would be entitled to retain 70% of that interest, or $21,000. The remaining
assets would stay in the bankruptcy estate for ultimate distribution to creditors.
The retained percentages for debtors whose ages fall between these categories
would be increased by 2% each year, so that a twenty-seven-year-old debtor
would retain 14% of her retirement benefits, and a sixty-eight-year-old debtor
would be entitled to 96% of otherwise allowable benefits.
There would be two exceptions to these guidelines. First, if a debtor can
establish that he is permanently disabled and thus will be unable to rebuild a
pension before retirement, a bankruptcy judge would have the discretion to
allow the debtor to retain a greater percentage of accumulated retirement
benefits than the guidelines would otherwise permit. Second, because it
would be fundamentally unfair to permit a bankrupt debtor to retain a massive
retirement benefit while depriving creditors of payments on their claims, the
guidelines should contain a ceiling on allowable benefits. For defined benefit
plans, the ceiling would provide that a debtor could not exempt more than
$19,450 in annual pension benefits. This figure represents the highest annual
income level that is taxed at the lowest tax rate for single individuals. The
guidelines should allow that figure to be adjusted as tax brackets are adjusted
for inflation. In the case of a defined contribution plan, the ceiling calculation
is more difficult because the debtor receives a lump sum amount upon

distribution. The maximum allowable defined contribution plan benefit that
should be exempted would be an amount which, when invested at the then
current annual treasury bill rate, would yield an annual return of $19,450. For
example, a sixty-year-old debtor who has a $400,000 interest in his employer's profit-sharing plan would normally be able to retain 80% of that figure,
or $320,000. If the current annual treasury bill rate is 10%, a $320,000
investment would yield a $32,000 annual return, disregarding any compounding factor. Because that $32,000 amount exceeds the maximum ceiling of
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$19,450 annually, the debtor would only be able to exempt $194,500, rather
than $320,000, from his profit-sharing plan under this ceiling rul.
The advantages of these guidelines are threefold. First, they offer
certainty to debtors contemplating bankruptcy, thereby allowing them to make
informed decisions regarding the appropriate course of action to take. For
example, the guidelines eliminate the possibility that courts will adopt the
position currently espoused by the Third Circuit that only those benefits
currently in pay status are reasonably necessary for support. Second, the
guidelines relieve judges of difficult facts and circumstances hearings, thus
reducing their burdensome dockets, if only slightly. Finally, they harmonize
the policies of ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code by allowing debtors to retain
at least a portion of their retirement assets while also providing creditors some
of the benefit of these often substantial assets.
The criticism that can be waged against these guidelines is that they
provide only rough justice, ignoring the particularities of individual debtors
and failing to take into account their special monetary needs. While this
criticism is well-founded, bankruptcy judges currently tend to adopt an all-ornothing approach, either permitting the debtor to retain all pension benefits or
allowing him to retain none, despite the purported flexibility currently afforded
them under'the statute. Although the proposed guidelines may not accurately
reflect the amount that a thirty-year-old debtor will need for support upon
retirement in thirty-five years, the benefits of this bright-line approach
nevertheless are a significant improvement over the realities of the present
system.
3. Eliminating State Pension Exemption Schemes in Bankruptcy
In many instances a debtor's pension rights will be among the most
important assets involved in the bankruptcy process. The proposal outlined
in this Article suggests that pension benefits should be included in the
bankruptcy estate initially, but can then be exempted out of the estate to the
extent that they are reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and her
dependents. To be effective, however, this proposal requires that federal
legislation be enacted preempting State pension exemption statutes in the
bankruptcy context.
The Bankruptcy Commission established to review the old Bankruptcy
Act and to recommend reform measures harshly criticized the old Act's
reliance on state exemption statutes because they "(1) increased administrative
expenses and promoted delays, (2) treated creditors inequitably, (3) often
provided debtors with either overly generous or insufficient exemptions, and
(4) delegated a national policy concern to localized and unresponsive
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legislative bodies."33 As a result, when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
Code in 1978, it created the federal exemption scheme found in section 522(d)
of the Bankruptcy Code as in alternative to these state exemption provisions
to assure that debtors would retain6 at least a minimal amount necessary for
3
their fresh start after bankrupty.
There are three possible scenarios when comparing a state's pension
exemption scheme with the federal scheme. Each scenario suggests that the
existence of the state scheme governing pension benefits is unwarranted in
light of the policies that the Bankruptcy Code is attempting to promote and
should thus be eliminated in the bankruptcy context. 337 First, a state may
enact a pension exemption scheme substantially similar to section 522(d)'s
federal scheme. In such a situation, the state scheme is duplicative and,
therefore, unnecessary.
Second, a state may enact an exemption scheme relating to pension
benefits that is far less generous than the federal scheme. 338 Under such a
scenario, if the state has not opted out of the federal scheme, a debtor in
bankruptcy will choose the more generous federal exemptions and the state
exemption system will prove unnecessary. If, on the other hand, the state has
opted out, a debtor will be forced to use the state's scheme and will be denied

335. Fox, Section 522(b)(1): An Examinationof the Opt-OutProviso,1983 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 395, 398 (footnotes omitted).
336. One commentator described the various states' exemption schemes before
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code as follows:
Exemptions in some states were criticized as being obsolete and "parsimonious in the extreme" ....

[O]ther states' exemptions were perceived as

being overly generous to debtors and unfair to creditors. The result was a
bankruptcy exemption policy which treated debtors and creditors'unequally
based solely upon the domicile of the debtor.
Duncan, Through the Trap Door Darkly: Nebraska Exemption Policy and The

Bankruptcy Reform Act of.1978, 20 NEB. L. REv. 219, 222 (1981) (citing Countryman,
Consumers in Bankruptcy Cases, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 2 (1978)). See also Mordy,
Dunn & Johnson, Constitutionalityof "Opt Out" Statutes Providingfor Exemptions to
Bankrupts, 48 Mo. L. REv. 627, 628 (1983), wherein the authors stated that "[p]rior

to enactment of the 1978 Code, the task of formulating a substantive exemption policy
was abdicated to the states. As a result, an incongruous patchwork of exemptions was

created, varying greatly from state to state." (footnotes omitted).
337. It is the author's personal view that all state exemption provisions be
eliminated in bankruptcy for the reasons discussed herein. For purposes of addressing
the issues outlined in this Article, however, it is only proposed that state pension
exemption provisions be preempted by the Bankruptcy Code.

338. Or, worse yet, the state might not amend an antiquated scheme in which a
horse and buggy could be exempted without limitation, and yet the exemption of
retirement benefits is not addressed at all.
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the fresh start envisioned by Congress in enacting the federal scheme, with its
minimal level of exemptions necessary for such a fresh start."'
Under the third scenario, a state may enact a pension exemption scheme
far more generous than the federal scheme. In such a situation, the opt-out
provision does not even come into play, because debtors in opt-out states and
non-opt-out states alike will surely choose their state's exemption scheme over
the less generous federal scheme. A generous state exemption scheme
governing pension benefits certainly provides debtors with their necessary
fresh start,30 but at what cost? The Bankruptcy Code's goal of .maximizing
the return to creditors is being circumnvented, causing distrust of the bankruptcy system, and loss of the uniformity that it was intended to foster."
Moreover, when individuals begin to see that debtors in neighboring states
emerge from bankruptcy with their $500,000 pensions preserved, those debtors
with substantial retirement assets to protect who find themselves on the brink
of financial ruin may be tempted to "forum shop" by moving to a state with
more generous pension exemption provisions42
Surely this was not what Congress envisioned when it enacted the
Bankruptcy Code's dual exemption scheme. By permitting the use of statecreated pension exemptions in the federal bankruptcy context, Congress has

defeated its own stated policies. On the one hand, debtors in opt-out states
with restrictive pension exemption provisions will be denied their fresh start,
which is purportedly at the heart of the Bankruptcy Code. On the other hand,
creditors in states with exemption provisions governing retirement benefits that

are more generous than the federal scheme will receive minimal returns on
their claims, thereby thwarting the policy of equitable distribution to the
creditors of bankrupt debtors. Both situations circumvent the Bankruptcy
Code's purpose of creating uniformity and certainty in the bankruptcy context.
Accordingly, the use of state pension exemption schemes should be
preempted in bankruptcy proceedings by the federal pension exemption

339. This is precisely the reason why Congress drafted a uniform set of
exemptions. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6087.

340. In fact, some courts and commentators have suggested that the debtor is
being afforded a "heaid start." See, e.g., In re Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 876 (8th Cir.
1988); Koger & Reynolds, supra note 313, at 468.
341. For a discussion of the uniformity issue, see Fox, supra note 335, at 401-03,
412-13.
342. For example, one article discusses a case in which the debtor was permitted
to retain a $320,000 house, a Jaguar, a Cadillac, and a Jeep through generous
exemption provisioni and a series of business transactions. See Mordy, Dunn &
Johnson, supra note 336, at 627. See also Jackson, supra note 191, at 1437, in which
the author suggests that debtors would be discouraged from changing residence prior
to bankruptcy were there to be a uniform exemption scheme.
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scheme. This could be accomplished simply by adding preemption language
to section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Eliminating state pension exemption schemes would not only better
promote the policies of the Bankruptcy Code and provide uniformity regarding
pension benefits in the federal bankruptcy context, but it would also simplify
the exemption process because bankruptcy attorneys and judges would not be
required to analyze individual states' pension exemption schemes in
determining those retirement assets that are available for exemption. Such a
proposal would also discourage debtors from changing their states of residence
in order to take advantage of a more generous exemption scheme available in
another state.
Finally, eliminating state pension exemption schemes in bankruptcy
would solve the problems created by ERISA's preemption of state law. A
majority of courts have held that ERISA preempts state pension exemption
provisions. Therefore debtors in states that have opted out of the federal
exemption scheme find that they are unable to exempt their pension benefits
at all. By forcing debtors to resort only to the federal exemption provisions,
they are assured of being able to retain at least a portion of their retirement
benefits in bankruptcy. Of course, state pension exemption provisions will
continue to be widely utilized in non-bankruptcy situations.
4. Permitting Conversion within the Federal Exemption Scheme
If a debtor is allowed to exempt-a portion of his pension benefits out of
his bankruptcy estate, he may be tempted to place nonexempt assets beyond
the reach of creditors by selling them and investing the proceeds in a
retirement plan. As discussed previously, this conversion process was
apparently condoned by the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code; a number of
courts, however, have denied the debtor a discharge from his debts if such
pre-petition conversion is coupled with extrinsic evidence of an intent to
defraud creditors 34 1 Many of the cases that have found such pre-filing
conversion fraudulent as to creditors have involved state exemption schemes
wherein debtors converted large amounts of nonexempt assets into exempt
assets on the eve of bankruptcy.3 4 If overly generous state pension exemption schemes are unavailable in bankruptcy, much of the risk of conversion is
thereby eliminated. Because only one uniform federal pension exemption
scheme will be available to all debtors filing for bankruptcy relief under this
proposal, debtors should thus be permitted to take full advantage of the

343. See, e.g., In re Armstrong, 127 Bankr. 852, 853 (D. Neb. 1989).
344. For example, the case of In re Tveten, 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988),
involved a pre-petition conversion of over $700,000 of nonexempt property into
exempt property just prior to bankruptcy.
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available federal exemptions, even if it involves converting nonexempt assets
on the eve of bankruptcy.
The advantages of permitting pre-filing conversion without limitation are
obvious. First, the administrative burden on bankruptcy judges will be
reduced because they will not be required to hold time-consuming hearings to
determine if pre-filing conversion has risen to the level of fraud. Moreover,
debtors will not be penalized simply because their assets are invested in
nonexempt property rather than exempt property, such as a pension plan. As
a result, the goal of uniformity will be preserved, and most debtors will be
afforded the same fresh start after bankruptcy. It is a well-settled axiom of tax
law that taxpayers should be entitled to reduce their taxes as much as possible
by taking full advantage of all deductions available to them under the law.
Similarly, pre-petition conversion allows debtors to retain the maximum
amount of property available for their fresh start by taking full advantage of
the exemptions afforded them under federal bankruptcy law.
5. Amending ERISA's Anti-Alienation Provisions
Because the Internal Revenue Service has consistently asserted that
including retirement benefits in a debtor's bankruptcy estate violates ERISA's
anti-alienation provisions and results in plan disqualification, an amendment
to ERISA is necessary to prevent plans from losing their tax-deferred status.
In 1984, Congress amended ERISA to provide an exception to its antialienation provisions for transfers made pursuant to a qualified domestic
relations order. A similar exception should be created for qualified bankruptcy orders. The provision could read as follows:
(d)Assignment or alienation of plan benefits
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated.
(4) (A) Paragraph (1)shall not apply to any assignment,
alienation or recognition of a right to any benefit
payable with respect to a participant pursuant to a
qualified bankruptcy order.
(3) A qualified bankruptcy order is any judgment,
decree, or order (including approval of a settlement
agreement) which (I) is granted by a court of competent
jurisdiction, and
(I) provides that all or a portion of a
.participant's benefits be turned over to the
bankruptcy trustee in a case commenced
u.nder Title 11 of this Code.
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The exception should appear both in ERISA's labor provisions, found in
section 1056(d) of Title 29 of the United States Code, as well as in ERISA's
tax provisions, found in section 401(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code.
This qualified bankruptcy order exception will ensure that retirement
plans are not disqualified and do not lose their tax-advantaged status simply
because one participant's benefits are included in his bankruptcy estate for
ultimate distribution to his creditors. Such an amendment will enable plan
administrators to satisfy both their fiduciary obligations to other plan
participants and their legal obligations pursuant to a court order requiring that
assets be assigned to the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of creditors.
6. Amending ERISA to Permit Immediate Turnover of Assets
One thorny problem that emerges when retirement benefits are included
in thd bankruptcy estate is exactly what creditors are entitled to receive. If the
estate remains open until an event triggering distribution occurs, such as the
debtor's death, retirement, or termination of employment, then not only are
administrative difficulties created, but, in addition, the present value of such
future pension benefits to the creditors is relatively low. Moreover, it is
unlikely that any market will develop for the purchase of a right to receive the
future income stream from a debtor's retirement benefits.
An immediate turnover of retirement plan assets for distribution to
creditors thus appears the most prudent resolution of the issue. Unfortunately,
ERISA contains no provision allowing such immediate turnover when the plan
participant has no present right to the funds. Accordingly, ERISA should be
amended to allow retirement plans to make lump-sum distributions to
bankruptcy estates for the benefit of creditors. In this way, the administrative
burden of keeping the estate open until an event triggering distribution occurs
will be eliminated and creditors can be paid immediately. An advantage of
this proposal is that creditors will be entitled to take an immediate tax
to
deduction for any unpaid portion of their debt, rather than being required
3 45
defer the tax write-off until a distribution occurs in the distant future.
In the case of defined contribution plans, the plan should have no
difficulty in making a lump-sum payment to the bankruptcy estate because the
funds are currently available in the participant's account. In defined benefit
plans, however, a plan's funding may not have taken into account the
possibility of such a lump-sum distribution. Consequently, pension plans may
have to adjust their funding levels to account for such a contingency.34 6 The
bankruptcy trustee should deduct any tax liability resulting from the

345. I.R.C. § 166 (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
346. A complete discussion of ERISA's funding requirements is beyond the scope
of this Article.
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distribution of benefits-including any penalties associated with the premature
withdrawal of such benefits-from the distribution as an administrative
expense before the assets are divided among creditors. 4 7
VI. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy judges, attorneys, trustees, and plan administrators are
expending enormous amounts of time and resources in an attempt to determine
the status of a debtor's retirement benefits in bankruptcy. It is time for
Congress to act. It is not enough, however, for Congress to conclude that
retirement benefits should be included in the bankruptcy estate. It must also

address the collateral consequences that such an action will have on ERISA,
as well as the exemption issues raised thereby. The solution outlined in this
article addresses all of these concerns, and does so in a way that harmonizes
the competing policies of ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code. Congress is
urged to adopt such a comprehensive solution immediately, before valuable
resources are depleted further.

347. These taxes and penalties should be considered a first priority administrative
expense pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1), 503(b) (1988).
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